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ABSTRACT 
Köremezli, İbrahim 
M.A.   Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. Hakan Kırımlı 
September 2004 
 
In this work, the Ottoman policy regarding the Circassians, the indigenous 
inhabitants of the North-western Caucasus, and in that respect the Russo-Ottoman 
relations will be analyzed. This study will cover the period from 1830 to 1864 when 
a sanguinary war between Russia and the Circassian tribes took place, ending with 
the expulsion of the overwhelming majority of the local population and the 
establishment of the complete Russian control over Circassia. 
 
At that time, the Sublime Porte aimed to preserve the peaceful relations with 
Russia. Various internal problems of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a somewhat 
passive policy of the Porte towards the Caucasus, with the only exception of the 
Crimean War period. However, the deep-rooted Ottoman-Circassian relations, 
especially the slave trade, never stopped throughout the Russo-Circassian war despite 
all the preventive attempts of the Russian Empire. Besides, the activities of the 
Circassians, the English and the Poles in favor of Circassian resistance were 
conducted mainly through the Ottoman territories, which meant that the Ottoman 
Empire had a more important place for the Circassian resistance when compared with 
its own policies concerning Circassia. 
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ÖZET 
Köremezli, İbrahim 
Master tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doçent Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
Eylül 2004 
 
Bu çalışmada, Çerkes olarak tesmiye edilen kabilelerin yaşadığı Kuzeybatı 
Kafkasya’da Rusya İmparatorluğu ile bölge halkı arasında cereyan eden ve 
Çerkeslerin büyük bir çoğunluğunun Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na sürülmesi ve 
Rusların da bölgeyi tam olarak kontrol altına almalarıyla sonuçlanan 34 yıllık savaş 
müddetince (1830-1864) Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Çerkezistan politikası ve bu 
bağlamda Rusya ile münasebatı açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır.  
 
Bu dönemde, Bab-ı Âli Rusya İmparatorluğu ile barışın devamını 
amaçlamaktaydı. Zaten, Devlet içerisindeki muhtelif meselelerden dolayı Kırım 
Harbi dönemi haricinde Bab-ı Âli aktif bir Kafkasya politikası izleyememiştir. Ancak 
kökleşmiş Osmanlı-Çerkez münasebatı, özellikle de köle ticareti Rusya’nın her türlü 
engellemelerine rağmen Rus-Çerkez savaşı sırasında da devam etmiştir. Bunun 
yanında, Çerkez, İngiliz ve Lehlerin Çerkez mücadelesi lehindeki aktivitelerini 
Osmanlı toprakları üzerinden gerçekleştirmiş olmaları Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun 
Çerkez mücadelesinde izlemiş olduğu politikadan daha ehemmiyetli bir yeri haiz 
olduğunu göstermektedir. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this thesis, from the Treaty of Edirne on 14 September 1829 when the 
Ottoman Empire abandoned all its rights to the Circassian coast, to the final defeat of 
the people called “Circassians” on 21 May 1864, the Ottoman Empire’s role in the 
Russo-Circassian War (1830-1864) will be analyzed. Searching the place and the 
significance of the Ottoman Empire in the long-lasting resistance of the Circassians 
against the Russian aggression, on the one hand Sublime Porte’s stable policies over 
Circassia will be tried to be found out while on the other hand the varieties, will be 
discussed. Beyond political and military aspects, social, cultural and economic 
characteristics of the Ottoman-Circassian relations will be searched and highlighted.  
 
How could the Circassians so long resist against Russia’s persistent attacks? 
Geography and the mountaineers’ commitment for the preservation of their 
independent way-of-life were probably the most important reasons. One other reason 
for this stubborn defense was the Polish and Russian deserters, who struggled on the 
side of the mountaineers as technical workers teaching how to make gunpowder and 
how to use cannons, and elaborated the nature and tactics of the Russian forces. 
Apart from that, there is of course a direct or indirect role of the Ottoman Empire in 
the Russo-Circassian War as far as the internal and international conditions allowed.  
 
Circassia was so close to the Ottoman Empire, and the trade, especially the 
slave trade, was so rooted that it could not be possible for Russia to cut off Ottoman-
Circassian relations throughout the war. Besides, Islam which flourished among the 
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Circassians in parallel to the war against Russia made the Ottoman Empire, the state 
of the Caliph, to be much more important for the Circassian resistance. That’s why 
the social aspect had a great say-so in understanding the nature of relations between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Circassians.  
 
The expansion of the Russian rule towards the Ottoman Empire’s core 
territories, i.e. Balkans and Anatolia can normally be expected to result in further 
caution of the Ottoman government, which was concerned about the utilization of the 
local Muslim population in the North Caucasus as a set against the Russian advance. 
However, the Ottoman archival sources reveal that in the face of the internal and 
international circumstances, Circassia did not seem to be one of the primary concerns 
of the Ottoman Empire. More importantly, the preservation of peace with the 
Russian Empire was one of the main aims of the Porte. Not to forget, those years also 
coincide with the Tanzimat period when the Ottoman Empire was under a dramatic 
ideological and institutional transformation trying to reorganize its internal 
mechanisms. Other internal problems, especially the Egyptian question also added to 
this internal reformation process, the Ottoman Empire was not in a position to 
participate actively in the affairs of the Caucasus.  
 
When an opportunity emerged, as in the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire did 
try to exploit it. With the exception of this period; however, it is not possible to claim 
that the Ottoman Empire pursued an active policy (or maybe any policy for that 
matter) for the ongoing war in both segments of the Caucasus; it rather tried to 
prevent any development that might damage the peaceful relations with Russia.   
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The subject of this research covers the period when the so-called “Eastern 
Question” became the most important agenda of the Great Powers. Besides Greek, 
Egyptian, and Straits Questions, one other part of the Eastern Question was the war 
going on between the Caucasian peoples and Russia. Therefore, Caucasus was not 
just a part of the rivalry among the regional powers, but it also became a dimension 
of the Great Power politics.  
 
As for Russia, the Northern Caucasus was a land of unruly and unreliable 
people, which could be an important handicap for Russia’s further advances, and 
therefore, as a well-established state policy, the war in the Caucasus should be 
concluded as soon as possible. This war was totally an internal matter, and any kind 
of foreign activity related to the Caucasus was treated with great suspicion, and even 
considered as an act of aggression against Russian interests. Therefore, Ottoman 
merchants or British adventurers were perceived by the Russian officials with this 
state of mind.  
 
On the other hand, Britain after the Treaty of Edirne did not cease to question 
the legal rights of Russia over Circassia, but only through diplomatic maneuvers 
without risking a war. It should be underlined that there was a powerful private 
diplomacy, which would foster the Russophobia in Great Britain in 1830s. While 
David Urquhart was the pioneer of the anti-Russian campaign, journeys and 
residences of several “adventurers” (Stewart, Knight, Longworth, Bell, and Spencer) 
in Circassia all worked for the establishment of a public who is dubious about the 
loyalty of Russia to the preservation of the Vienna regime, and sensitive to the 
matters of Caucasus. This circle was not totally apart from the British official dom, 
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however propagated a more radical foreign policy against Russia’s activities. The 
successive British ambassadors in Istanbul i.e. Lord Ponsonby and Stratford Canning 
were also more convinced of a Russian threat than the British government and the 
Foreign Office.1  
 
This being the case, by and large, the British government did not perceive 
Circassia as fundamental issue for the security of its vital interests. Besides Circassia, 
Russia and Britain were also in competition in Persia, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. 
However, the rivalry centered in the capital of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
In this connection, Circassian question should be located in the picture of the 
so-called Eastern Question without ignoring, however, the special social, economic 
and cultural relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Circassians. 
Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the internal developments in the 
Ottoman Empire, international environment, as well as the Russian and British 
policies and their perceptions of the Caucasus in order to understand the policy and 
the significance of the Ottoman Empire regarding Circassia. 
 
Since the Edirne Treaty of 1829 is the starting point of this research, at first the 
question how this treaty affected the situation in Circassia both de jure and de facto 
should be answered. However, to understand the significance of the Treaty of Edirne, 
initially, first involvements of the Ottomans and the Russians in Circassia will be 
explained. Afterwards the Circassian War and the Ottoman role in this war will be 
analyzed in a chronological order.   
                                                 
1 Lord Ponsonby was the British Ambassador to Istanbul during 1833-1841; Stratford Canning was 
the British Ambassador to Istanbul during 1825-1829, 1831, 1841-46, 1848-51, 1853-58. 
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CHAPTER I 
OTTOMAN AND RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENTS IN THE 
CAUCASUS BEFORE THE TREATY OF EDIRNE 
 
This chapter aims to elaborate the initial Ottoman and Russian involvements in 
the Caucasus and the historical background of the Russian attack in Circassia. 
However, before explaining the historical details it is necessary to clarify the terms 
‘Circassia’ and ‘Circassian’.  
 
 
A. Circassians and Circassia 
 
The term “Çerkes” (in English “Circassian”) is an Ottoman (or rather Turkic) 
appellation which rendered three different meanings. In the general Ottoman 
parlance, it was an umbrella form for the most, if not all tribes of the North 
Caucasus. In its more sophisticated usages it came to denote either the North-
Western Caucasian tribes, comprised of the speakers of Abkhaz, Ubykh and Adyge 
languages, or those who spoke any version of the Adyge language.2 Throughout this 
work the Circassian resistance will mean the struggle of Adyges and Ubykhs against 
the Russian invasion of the Western part of the Caucasus, as in those years politically 
                                                 
2 Amjad Jaimoukha, The Circassians: a Handbook (Richmond, 2001), p. 11. 
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and culturally Ubykhs came closer to the Adyges.3 On the other hand, the Russian 
annexation of Abkhazia and Kabarda took place in a different context and 
circumstances; therefore they will not be covered in this study.4  
 
Circassians were indigenous peoples of the Caucasus divided into tribes and 
clans. Before expulsion, Circassian tribes were living in the lands between the Black 
Sea to the west and the River Sunja to the east and between the Caucasus Mountains 
to the south and the steppes north of the Kuban and the Pyatigorsk plains to the 
north. The Adyges were by far the largest of the North-Western Caucasian peoples 
using two main dialects - Kabarda and Abzekh, and lived in the territory from Anapa 
to the Sashe River. In the south of Sashe River to Ingora lived Abazins (Azeğa), who 
were composed of Jigets, Abkhaz and Sadze. While Kabardians and Besleneys 
composed the Eastern branch, the most important Western Adyge tribes can be listed 
as such: Abzekh or Abadzekh (in the basins of river Belaia. Laba, Pshish, Psekups 
and their tributaries), Temirgoy (to the east of Bzhedugh and the Khatukay between 
                                                 
3 Russian officer F. F. Tornau who lived as a captive among the Circassians claims, “I did not meet 
any speaker of Ubykh language, whom I met were also speaking in Circassian”. Feodor Feodorovich 
Tornau, Bir Rus Subayının Kafkasya Anıları, translated by Keriman Vurdem (Ankara, 1999), p. 96. 
See also, T. Tatlok, “The Ubykhs”, Caucasian Review, Vol. 7 (1958), pp. 100-109 and Sefer E. 
Berzeg, Soçi’nin Sürgündeki Sahipleri Çerkes-Vubıhlar (Ankara, 1998). 
4 The other Eastern Black Sea coastlands more rapidly transferred to the possession of Russia, 
Mingrelia in 1803, Imeretia in 1804, Abkhazia in 1811, and Svanetia in 1837 were put under the rule 
of the Russian Empire. This situation was reflected in the Russian history with the famous argument 
of ‘voluntary adherence’ of these territories to the Russian rule as also tsarist colonel Esadze claimed 
in his book. Semen Esadze, Pokorenie zapadnogo Kavkaza i okonchanie Kavkazskoi voiny (Maikop, 
1993), p. 26.  
On the other hand, Russia’s first involvements in the Caucasus took place in Kabarda. While the first 
relations started during the time of Ivan the Terrible, the establishment of the Mozdok fortification in 
1763 signed the first ambitious initiative of Russia over Kabarda. It was the time when Russian-
Kabardian wars started. Ottoman Empire recognized the right of Russia over Kabarda with the Treaty 
of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. Kabardian lands were suppressed by Yermolov mercilessly in 1820s. 
Afterwards with the exception of a few uprisings Kabarda went under the control of the Russian 
Empire. Actually, Kabarda was strategically very important for Russia. Russian possession of 
Kabarda not only provided the security of the Georgia military way but also prevented any North 
Caucasian unity. Therefore, Russia always tried to isolate Kabarda from Shamil’s state and other 
Circassian tribes. For further details see, A. H. Kasumov, H. A. Kasumov, Genotsid Adygov: iz istorii 
borby adygov za nezavisimost v XIX veke (Nalchik, 1992), pp. 43-58 (hereafter Genotsid Adygov). 
Aytek Namitok, “The ‘Voluntary’ Adherence of Kabarda (Eastern Circassia) to Russia”, Caucasian 
Review, Vol. 2 (1955), pp. 17-33. 
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Kuban, Laba and Belaia rivers), Makhosh (to the South of Temirgoy on the upper 
reaches of the river Farza), Khatukhay (on the Taman Peninsula), Natukhay (on the 
Black Sea coast from Anapa to river Dzubga), Shapsugh (to the east of Natukhay), 
and Bzhedugh (to the east of the Shapsugh). Around the river Sashe, between 
Adyges and Abazins Ubykhs lived.5  
 
Until the Russian conquest, Circassians maintained a very archaic social 
structure altering from tribe to tribe. However, generally the Circassian society was 
composed of four classes: princes (pshi), nobles (vork, özden), freemen (tokav, 
tlfokotl) and serfs (pshitl).6  Captain Edmund Spencer very well explains the social 
life of Circassians:  
 
…their form of government may be said to be a species of aristocratic 
republic, composed of chiefs, nobles, and clansmen, in whom rank is only 
recognized in their public and patriarchal capacity, as chieftains, lawgivers, 
and elders; otherwise a perfect equality exists in all the relations of social 
and domestic life.7  
 
Such a way of life prevented Circassians to develop a centralized authority but 
to live in a tribal confederation; however their devotion to independent way of life 
protected their freedom against any foreign domination. This and other cultural 
characteristics of Circassians played a role in the Circassian resistance against 
Russia.8 
 
 
                                                 
5 Tornau, pp. 50, 95-96; Ramazan Traho, “Literature on Circassia and Circassians”, Caucasian 
Review, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 145. 
6 See “Čerkes”, Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II (Leiden, 1983), pp. 21-25.  
7 Captain Spencer, Turkey, Russia, the Black Sea, and Circassia (London, 1854), p. 348. 
8 For further information about Circassian culture and geography, see Leonti Lyulye [L’Huilier], 
Çerkesya: Tarihi-Etnografik Makaleler 1857-1862-1866, translated by Murat Papşu (İstanbul, 1998).  
 7
B. First Involvements 
 
For centuries controlling the surroundings of the Kuban River Crimean Khans 
made expeditions to Circassia with no aim but plundering. While for the Ottoman 
Empire the southern Caucasus was important strategically concerning its rivalry with 
Iran, it never tried to control North Caucasus, which was seen as a peripheral area, 
and a matter of the Crimean Khans. However, after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
with the loss of the Crimea and Kuban, Circassia turned into the front defense line of 
the Ottoman Empire against Russia’s further advance. At this period, the Soğucak 
fortress on the Northeastern coast of the Black Sea became crucial, and in the north 
of it was Anapa fortress constructed by French architects.  
 
On the other hand, Russia’s first initiatives to conquer Caucasus started soon 
after the demise of the Golden Horde as the fall of Kazan and Astrakhan opened the 
way to the steppes north of the Caucasus. During their never-ending wars with 
Mongols and Tatars, the Kabardians sought to build closer relations with Russia from 
whom they perceived less threat being relatively distant. Such involvements of 
Russia date back to Ivan the Terrible when the delegation of Kabarda Prince 
requested the help of the Russian state.9 At the same time the Cossacks around the 
Terek River also asked for the protection of Ivan the Terrible.10 With the failure of 
the Astrakhan campaign of the Ottoman Empire in 1570, it then became clear that 
Russia would be one of the “major players in the game of Caucasian politics”.11 
However, the Russian desires over the North Caucasus were checked in 1605 when a 
                                                 
9 This resulted with the demagogy of the voluntary adherence of Kabarda (and from here all 
Caucasus) to Russia. For the first relations of the Kabarda and the Russians, and the discussion of 
voluntary adherence see, Namitok, pp. 17-33. 
10 Esadze, p. 15. 
11 Jaimoukha, p. 52. 
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combined force of the Shamkhal of Daghestan and the Ottoman Empire dealt with a 
blow to the Russian ambitions, and the Russian project over Caucasus was to be 
delayed for almost 130 years.12  
 
Therefore, though Russia’s activities in the Caucasus date back to sixteenth 
century, real involvements came in the 18th century under the rule of Peter the Great. 
Before that, owing to Cossack establishments, Slavic stock in the Caucasus began to 
form.13 With the Cossack stanitsas (military villages) the core of the future Russian 
military lines across the Caucasus was started to be established. In 1721, the Terek 
Cossacks submitted to Peter the Great, and from then on they became the potent 
force in the Russian drive through the Northern Caucasus.14  
 
In the resulting treaty of Belgrade in 1739 after 1736-1739 Russo-Ottoman 
war, the independence of Kabarda was formally guaranteed. After the Russo-Turkish 
war of 1768-1774 ending up with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Ottoman Empire 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 The Cossacks made their first appearance in the North Caucasus in the sixteenth century. They 
settled in the steppes north of the river Sunja and along the Lower Terek. Among their earliest 
settlements were Tarku and Andreyevo. Initially relations between the Cossacks and the Northern 
Circassians were friendly, no real danger being perceived by the local population. The Cossacks begin 
to adopt Circassian customs, and the North Caucasian way of life. By the turn of the 18th century 
relations between the Cossacks and the North Caucasians had become antagonistic as Cossack 
settlements penetrated into the Northern Caucasus. Thomas Barrett divides the Russian settlements in 
three stages: “From the 1560s up to 1721, free Cossack villages appeared along the eastern Terek, the 
first Russian forts were built in the same region; in 1721 the Terek Cossacks were withdrawn from the 
authority of the Foreign Office (Posol’skii prikaz), put under the command of the War College and 
transformed into servants of state. Only in the second stage (1722-1775) did the Russian government 
begin resettling significant numbers of Cossacks and other service people. Several new forts were 
built along the Terek, including the first permanent one, Kizliar. During the third stage (1776-1860) 
the military line was completed and pushed further into the mountains; Cossacks were resettled all 
along the line, the Zaporozhian Cossacks were reconstituted as the Black Sea Cossacks and awarded 
lands in the Kuban region, and the resettlement and spontaneous migration of large numbers of 
peasants began.” Thomas Barrett, “Lines of Uncertainty: the Frontiers of the North Caucasus”, Slavic 
Review, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Fall 1995), p. 591. 
14 Jaimoukha, p. 58.  
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not only lost Crimea but also ceded Kabarda.15 Afterwards Russia occupied the 
northern Kuban in 1781 and annexed the Crimea in 1783. Actually, Catherine II 
embarked on an ambitious and well-established plan to break the Caucasus from 
Turkish influence and annex it to her ever-expanding empire. The northern frontier 
of Circassia with its fortresses would be used as a catalyst for further expansion. The 
first military outpost, Mozdok, was established in Kabarda in 1763 on the left bank 
of the Terek. V. A. Potto underlines this incident as the start of the Russo-Caucasian 
war.16 By 1769, Russian line of fortifications was extended eastwards to Kızlar in 
Dagestan, followed by a string of fortresses in the opposite direction that extended 
northwestwards to the Sea of Azov, forming the so-called Caucasian Military Line.  
 
As a result of completion of the Terek-Mozdok line in 1777 and Mozdok-Azak 
line in 1782, establishment of two corpses (Kubanskii and Kavkazskii) again in 
1782, and Suvorov’s harsh defeat of the Kuban Nogays in 1783, north of the Kuban 
and Terek entered under the Russian control.17 Then in 1786 the Caucasian 
governorship was established, and in 1792 Black Sea Cossack Host was established 
in Taman peninsula.18 
 
 Russia’s activities and advance in the Caucasus urged the Ottoman Empire to 
establish a defense system in the Northern Caucasus. In 1781, Ferah Ali Pasha, an 
experienced Ottoman statesman, was appointed the governor (vâli) of Soğucak to 
reinforce the defense there against Russia and to attract the Circassians to the 
                                                 
15 In the treaty it was stated that the adherence of Kabarda to Russia must take place in agreement with 
the Crimean Khan. However, Crimea did not recognize any right of Russia over Kabarda. Namitok, p. 
28. 
16 Polovinkina, p. 107. 
17 It was actually a total annihilation of the Nogay population in Kuban. 
18 Esadze, pp. 16-17. 
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Ottoman side by strengthening Islam there. In 1781 he would establish the Anapa 
fortress near the Taman peninsula, which would be the front defense against Russia. 
Anapa also served as the base from which the Ottomans maintained their political 
and commercial contacts with the North-Western Caucasians.19 
 
In 1787, struggle resumed between the Russians and Ottomans. The former 
destroyed a Circassian force under Sheikh Mansur20, who took refuge in Anapa. This 
strategic port was taken by the Russians on 21 June 1791 by General Gudovich, and 
Sheikh Mansur fell into the Russian hands. However, according to the Treaty of Yaş 
of 29 December 1792, Russia ceded Anapa back to the Ottoman Empire. In 1807, 
Russians took back Anapa and other ports, and returned them back in 1812 with the 
Bucharest Treaty. Actually, in every defense of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus 
Anapa fortress played a key role. Therefore, to protect the fortress from the Russian 
assault, Circassians actively participated in the Russo-Ottoman wars in the side of the 
Ottomans.21 
 
However, it seems that there hardly was a unity among the Circassians as to 
which state they should turn to, that is the Ottomans or Russians. Circassians were 
                                                 
19 For the activities of Ferah Ali Pasha, and the Ottoman policies regarding Circassia till the Treaty of 
Edirne see, Cemal Gökçe, Kafkasya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Kafkasya Siyaseti (Istanbul, 
1979). Ferah Ali Pasha’s activities attracted so much interest that in Turkey a number of thesis written 
on his role in Circassia, see, Zübeyde Güneş Yağcı, “Ferah Ali Paşa’nın Soğucak Muhafızlığı 1781-
1785”, Ph.D Thesis, On Dokuz Mayıs University (Samsun, 1998); Ali Barut, “Kuzey Kafkaslara Rus 
İlerleyişi Karşısında Anapa Muhafızı Ferah Ali Paşa'nın Askeri ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1781-1784)”, 
M.A Thesis, Kırıkkale University (Kırıkkale, 1997); Ali Asmaz, “Vezir Ferah Ali Paşa'nın Hayatı, 
Şahsiyeti ve Çerkezler'in Osmanlı Devleti Hizmetine Kazandırılmasındaki Faaliyetleri”, M. A. Thesis, 
Çanakkale University (Çanakkkale, 1991). 
20 The mystical warrior, Sheikh Mansur, made his first mark on the history of the North Caucasus in 
1785. He was the first leader who tried to unite the North Caucasus against Russia with the cause of a 
Holy War. His successes against Russia also attracted the Circassians to his side. After his defeat in 
Kabarda he took refuge in the Western Circassia. He then coordinated his actions with the Ottoman 
Empire. After he was captured by the Russians he was sent to Schlüsselburg Prison where he was (in 
all probability) killed in 1793. 
21 Esadze, pp. 17, 26, 28. 
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not only disunited, but also were not stable in their choices. Their relations with the 
Pasha of Anapa, and the Russian policies in this respect were important to 
understand the behavior of the Circassians. Russia was trying to attract Circassians 
with a profitable trade, and it was not useless. Besides, the tribes or families having 
difficulties in the trans-Kuban were trying to immigrate to the Russian territories 
around the river Kuban.22 On the other hand, Anapa was a city for the Circassians 
where they could wander, trade, and rest. The Pashas of Anapa fortress were not only 
giving feasts and gifts to demonstrate the generosity of Turks, but they were also 
marrying the daughters of the Circassian Princes or members of the aristocratic 
families to establish strong ties with the tribes. Without any attempt to impose 
Ottoman institutions per se to Circassia, the Ottoman Empire tried to establish some 
kind of a loose suzerainty over, or an alliance with, the Circassians.23 As a result of 
these social bonds, prior to the Treaty of Edirne the Circassians overwhelmingly took 
side with the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Ottoman wars.24 No doubt, such 
relations would leave positive implications for the Ottoman Empire in the memory of 
the Circassians even after the Treaty of Edirne.  
 
During first decades of the nineteenth century, Russia’s position got stronger 
also in the Trans-Caucasus. In 1801, Pavel declared Russian suzerainty over Georgia, 
and by this way the Russo-Georgian alliance from the time of Yekaterina and Irakli 
was concluded with the full Russian domination. After this first step, Russia’s 
                                                 
22 Genotsid Adygov, pp. 58-59, 63-64. 
23 In the Ottoman archives there are considerable amount of documents about the relationships of the 
governors of Anapa and the Circassians. Only to give an example: in 1794 Ottoman commander 
(serasker) of Anapa Mustafa Pasha had the Circassians to sign a written contract (taahhütname), and 
distributed to the Circassian princes gifts. The Ottoman Archives of the Turkish Prime Ministry 
[Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, hereafter to be cited as BOA] HAT, Dosya No.: 197, Gömlek No.: 
9895. Such contracts, trusts (amanat), distribution of gifts to the Circassian princes and political 
marriages were actually the characteristics of the Ottoman relationship in Circassia. 
24 Genotsid Adygov, p. 62. 
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victories in 1806-12 and 1826-29 against the Ottoman Empire resulted with the 
Treaties of Bucharest and Edirne. In addition to the victories against the Ottoman 
Empire, Russia was also victorious in its wars against Iran during the first decades of 
the nineteenth century which were concluded by the Treaties of Gülistan (1812) and 
Türkmençay (1828). Thus, within a few decades, Russia had decisively eliminated 
two rivaling powers for the domination of the Caucasus, and it could feel itself the 
sole and legitimate ruler of this land. However, the genuine control of the Caucasus 
should yet to be realized by the pacification of the indigenous mountainous 
population. The Russian strategists thought that it would not take long. They were 
blatantly wrong; however, the defense of the indigenous population in the Northern 
Caucasus would be so stiff that the war was to continue for decades to come. 
 
 
C. A General Look to the North Caucasian Resistance 
 
The first phase of the Russo-Circassian War was the war, which took place in 
the Kabarda territories. Only after the Eastern Circassia, known as Kabarda, was 
annexed, the war moved to the western part. The first open battle between the 
Russians and the Kabardians took place near the Malka River in 1771, which 
resulted in a Russian victory. After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca the war in 
Kabarda was intensified. In 1779, the bloodiest battle was fought among the 
Kabardians and the Russians, in which 50 princes and 350 nobles died. Russia would 
establish several fortresses in Kabardian lands to isolate Kabarda, especially from the 
Western Circassians, and to protect the military way to Tbilisi. Kabardians sought 
the protection of the Porte, and revolted against Russia during the Russo-Ottoman 
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wars of 1787-1791 and 1806-1812. General Yermolov, the military commander of 
the southern tsarist forces, arrived at the scene in 1816. In 1821, Yermolov 
demanded that the Kabardians living in mountainous areas move to the plains to 
facilitate their control. Then, the Caucasian military line was pushed further into the 
Kabardian territory and many massacres were committed by the Russian forces.  
 
The Kabardian resistance was localized and badly organized. The Circassian 
princes failed to form a united front, and the Russians took the advantage of the 
internal rivalries. In spite of their defeat, the Kabardians were always on the lookout 
for an external ally to rise up against the occupiers. They maintained contacts with 
Shamil and the other Circassians. However, with the exception of the year 1846, it is 
not possible to mention about any armed stand of a significant dimensions against 
Russians after Yermolov effectively crushed the organized Kabardian resistance.25 
Actually Russia was successful in its aim to provide the security of the military way 
to Tbilisi, and to prevent a North Caucasian union by controlling Kabarda. 
 
The war in the North-Eastern Caucasus, which is more popular and widely 
known with its holy war and especially with its legendary leader Sheikh Shamil, took 
place simultaneously and with many parallels with the war in the Circassian lands. 
However, the nature of the resistance in the North-Western Caucasus was radically 
different from the war in Circassia. It was the “muridizm”26 that unified the Eastern 
part of the Caucasus against Russia. The muridizm started in Dagestan under the 
                                                 
25 Namitok, pp. 27-31; Jaimoukha, p. 63. 
26 The sufi order in the Eastern Caucasus established during the war with Russia is generally known as 
“muridizm”. The seeds were sawn in the time of Sheikh Mansur, but muridizm took its strength 
during 1830s. Gazi Muhammed, Hamzat Bek, and Sheikh Shamil all tried to establish a state on the 
base of sharia to unite the North Caucasian mountaineers. All three Imams were affiliated by the 
Khalidi branch of the Naqshibandiyya order. See, “Shamil”, Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IX (Leiden, 
1996), pp. 283-288.  
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leadership of the legendary Sheikh Mansur in the last decades of the eighteenth 
century when the Russians had newly started to establish their rule in the Northern 
Caucasus, and became much popular and truly organized from 1820s that is the time 
of Gazi Muhammed (Kazi Molla), the first Imam of the movement. After Gazi 
Muhammed and the second Imam Hamzat Bek Sheikh Shamil became as the third 
Imam who took the leadership of the holy war in the North-Eastern Caucasus. Sheikh 
Shamil was most successful in establishing a state with all its institutions, and even 
managing to unify the Northern Caucasus in certain respects. His naibs, especially 
Muhammed Emin played a prominent role in the Circassian struggle.27  
 
The nature of the societal relations and the nature of the war in the North-
Western Caucasus were significantly different from that of Sheikh Shamil’s state. 
Contrary to the egalitarian societal relations in Dagestan and Chechnya, the 
Circassian society divided into the classes in which the nobility kept to exercise 
many rights. However, during the war against Russia, some kind of a civil war was 
taking place in Circassia, which reduced the power of the noble class. Secondly, 
Islam was still insufficiently established in Circassia. The war itself accelerated the 
Islamization of the region in connection with the effect of the Ottoman Empire and 
Shamil’s naibs in Circassia. Thirdly, being close to the Black Sea, Circassia was 
strategically very important for the Ottoman Empire, and Circassians had deep-
rooted contacts and relations with the Ottomans. Despite all the resistant activities 
                                                 
27 For comprehensive analyses of the war in Chechnya and Dagestan see, John F. Baddeley, The 
Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, (London, 1908); Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: 
Shamil and the Conquest of 
Chechnia and Daghestan (London, 1994). For the role of Islam in the war in Chechnya and Dagestan 
see, Anna Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom: The Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the 
North Caucasus (London, 2000).  
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and diplomatic efforts of Russia, trade between Circassia and the Ottoman Empire 
never ended even in the very harsh times of the war.28  
 
Circassian trade needs special attention to understand the Circassian relations 
with Russia and the Ottoman Empire. There were certain basic characteristics of the 
Circassian trade: First, in Circassia trade was overwhelmingly conducted with the 
primitive method of bartering goods. Second, internal trade in Circassia was 
insignificant and the external one was vital. The Circassians could sell slaves and 
certain agricultural products, and needed to buy such materials as salt, fabric, and 
munitions. The abundance of agricultural and animal products, as well as slaves also 
resulted in the decrease of the price of the export materials, thereby, presenting a 
very lucrative trade for the importers. Third, the main commodity was slaves, and the 
direction of the flaw was the Ottoman lands, especially Istanbul.29 
 
According to the Russian officials, the prerequisite of the submission of the 
Circassians was the end of the Circassian relations with the Ottoman Empire. To this 
effect, they established several forts in the Black Sea coast composing the Black Sea 
Coast Line. However, Russia could not succeed in preventing Ottoman-Circassian 
relations, moreover, this policy prevented the establishment of healthy relations 
between the Circassians and Russia.  
 
                                                 
28 For general Turkish works about the North Caucasian history, see, Kadircan Kaflı, Şimali Kafkasya 
(Istanbul, 1942); Özdemir Özbay, Dünden Bugüne Kuzey Kafkasya (Ankara, 1999); General İsmail 
Berkok, Tarihte Kafkasya (Istanbul, 1958). For an analytical overview of the Circassian resistance, 
see, Paul B. Henze, “Circassian Resistance to Russia” in The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian 
Advance towards the Muslim World, edited by Marie Bennigsen Broxup (London, 1992), pp. 62-111.  
29 V. K. Gardanov, Obshchestvennyi stroi adygskih narodov (XVIII – pervaia polovina XIX v.) 
(Moscow, 1967), pp. 111-122.  
Until the Russian conquest of the Crimea, it was the Crimean Tatars who conducted the slave trade, 
and it was Kaffa as the main exporting center of slaves. Then, Anapa, established mainly as a military 
post in 1781, became the center of the trade with the Circassians. 
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People of the Northern Caucasus, faced with the Russian attack, soon 
understood that without foreign aid it was not possible to get the Russians out of their 
homeland. This foreign aid might only come from or through the Ottoman territories. 
And Britain might be the supporter of the Circassian struggle if it perceived that a 
Russian Caucasus would be harmful for its best interests. Therefore, the Circassian 
envoys would always try to demonstrate how detrimental to the British interests the 
fall of Circassia was. 
 
In fact, both the Ottoman Empire and Britain were anxious about the Russian 
advance, and both were sympathetic to the resistance in the Northern Caucasus. 
However, neither the Ottoman Empire nor Britain would commit themselves to a 
struggle against Russia for the sake of the Caucasians; therefore their sympathies 
were not translated into a real alliance with the Northern Caucasians. However, the 
Ottoman Empire, which lost the entire Circassian coast from Anapa to St. Nicholas 
as a result of the Edirne Treaty, did not give up all its interests there. The Circassians 
not only were to play important roles against Russia in the Crimean War and the 
1877-78 War, but they would also continue to be a potential leverage for the 
Ottoman Empire in a possible conflict between the Ottomans and the Russians as 
being sworn enemies of the Russian Empire.  
 
While the rise of the threat from the North increased the strategic importance 
of the Caucasus for the Ottoman Empire, the importance of the Ottoman Empire for 
the mountaineers increased even more significantly. However, its incapability to 
affect the Russian war in the Caucasus directly, the Ottoman Empire could not 
involve actively in the Caucasian affairs. This, by no means, contradicts with the 
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significance of the Ottoman Empire regarding the Russo-Circassian war. First of all, 
it was the place where the Circassian and Polish émigrés made plans and 
preparations, and dealt diplomatic negotiations for the Russo- Circassian war. 
Moreover, the Circassian-Ottoman trade, the main financial and material source for 
the continuation of the war, never ceased till the final end of the war in Circassia.  
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CHAPTER II 
CIRCASSIA BETWEEN THE TREATY OF EDIRNE 
AND THE CRIMEAN WAR 
 
A. An Outline of the Post-Edirne Treaty Conditions 
The 1830s marks the beginning of a new period for Circassia. While the Treaty 
of Edirne on 14 September 182930 concluded that the Black Sea coasts from Anapa 
to St. Nicholas (south of Poti) were given to Russia, Russia interpreted it as the 
territory behind the coasts also became its property. The problem was that the 
Circassian territories had never entered under the direct Ottoman control before. 
Even though Circassians had firm commercial and religious bonds with the Ottoman 
Empire, political relations was the secondary matter till the last decades of the 
eighteenth century when the Russian threat was at its peak. Even then the Ottoman 
Empire did not engage in any initiative to make the Circassians tax-paying Ottoman 
subjects. Therefore, Circassians always argued that their territory had never been a 
part of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Empire had no right to yield Circassia 
to any other third party. On the other hand, during decades of war with Circassians, 
Russian authorities always argued that Circassians were only bandits who did not 
want to accept the legitimate authority.  
                                                 
30 For the Turkish version of the agreement see, Nihat Erim, Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasî Tarih 
Metinleri, Cilt I (Ankara, 1953), pp. 275-289; Vak’anüvís Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi Tarihi, Vol. III, 
transcribed by Tamer Erdoğan (Istanbul, 1999), pp. 498-504. 
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After the Treaty of Edirne, the Russian authorities thought themselves free to 
accomplish the occupation of the Northern Caucasus.31 Thereafter, Russia launched a 
fierce war of attrition, which met firm resistance for 35 years. In this struggle, Russia 
pursued a mixed policy to subdue the Western Circassians. While trying to co-opt the 
elite on the one hand, Russian government employed brutal coercive tactics on the 
other. Another central policy of Russia was the prevention of the supplies coming 
from the Ottoman Empire by imposing a naval blockade and establishing several 
strongholds on the coast of Circassia. 
 
Russia, new possessor of the Eastern coast of the Black Sea, at first thought 
that the bond between the Ottoman Empire and the Circassians was broken, and with 
the rise of the Russian trade Circassians would be pacified. That’s why between 1829 
and 1833, Russia first engaged in pacifying the North-Eastern Caucasus, which was 
perceived more urgent and threatening. However, Russia soon realized that strict 
measures were necessary to prevent relations between Circassians and the outside 
world. Afterwards, besides the reestablishment of Anapa fortress, a new fortress in 
the Gelincik Bay, and Gagra fortress were established. Entrances to Circassia and 
trade with the Circassian coasts were limited only with Anapa and Redutkale. 
Russian authorities announced that with the exception of these two ports, any 
contacts with the Circassians would be illegal. Russian military circles also started 
their researches to construct the maps of Circassia for the future military 
expeditions.32  
                                                 
31 A. H. Kasumov - H. A. Kasumov, “Osvoboditelnaia borba adigskikh narodov v XIX veke”, 
Cherkesiia v XIX veke (Maikop, 1991), p. 50. 
32 Norman Luxenburg, Rusların Kafkasya’yı İşgalinde İngiliz Politikası ve İmam Şamil, translated by 
Sedat Özden (İstanbul, 1998), pp. 80-81. 
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In the meantime, Circassians soon started to search a solution for the 
reconstruction of the pre-Edirne Treaty conditions. Yet, in November 1830 
Shapsughs and Natukhays held their first public meeting after the Edirne Treaty. In 
the meeting they agreed to send a delegation to Istanbul under the head of Zanoko 
Sefer.33 In Istanbul, the Circassian delegation was received and encouraged to resist 
Russia. The Porte not only distributed gifts, but also promised to help Circassia. 
After this mission, Zanoko Sefer did not return with the delegation but stayed in 
Istanbul. Now onwards he would be the head of all the diplomatic activities of the 
Circassians, and his encouragements would be influential on the Circassian defense 
especially in 1830s.34 Actually, Ottoman help to Circassia in 1830 demonstrated that 
the Ottoman interests did not end abruptly. In late 1830, the Ottoman Empire sent 15 
cannons and 300 barrels of gunpowder with officers who would teach Circassians 
how to use cannons.35  
 
In 1833, a new delegation was sent to Istanbul. At this point, the delegation 
was also received by the British Embassy, which promised help to Circassia. This 
meeting signaled that the 1830s would be an intensive period for the Circassian-
British relations and that the Circassian question would be brought to the 
international agenda. Circassians continued to send envoys to get diplomatic supports 
of both the Ottoman Empire and the European powers. In 1838, the Circassian 
                                                 
33 Being a Shapsugh (or Natukhay) prince and a member of the famous family Zan, Zanoko Sefer was 
given to the Russians as a trust (amanat). He studied in the Rishelevski lycee in Odessa, and was a 
cadet of a cavalry regiment. When he was serving as a cadet in the 22nd huntsmen regiment, he 
quarreled with his commander, and deserted from the army and went to the Ottoman Empire. 
Afterwards, he participated in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29 on the side of the Ottoman Empire. 
Then, he stayed in the Ottoman Empire for approximately 25 years till 1854, when he was sent to 
Sohumkale as an Ottoman Pasha. In the meantime of war he moved to the Anapa fortress. After the 
war he stayed in Circassia and died in 1859. Esadze, p. 69; Genotsid Adygov, p. 125 footnote 87. 
34 Polovinkina, pp. 112-113.  
35 However, Lapinskii claims that it was a characteristic Turkish help: the cannons were old, and the 
barrels were half empty. Ibid, p. 113. 
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delegation arrived in Britain, and met with the British Parliament and Queen 
Victoria. In 1839, the Circassians once more attempted to get the support of the 
Ottoman and British governments.36 Though these petitions did not yield the desired 
results for the Circassians, they were not absolutely useless or fruitless. These 
petitions would continue until the very end of the Circassian war, and became one of 
the characteristics of the Circassian struggle. In this context, Zanoko Sefer played an 
intermediary role between the foreign diplomatic circles and the Circassian 
missions.37  
 
During the 1830s, the Eastern Question dominated the Russo-British relations. 
When Russia was trying to establish its solid rule in the Northern Caucasus with the 
advantage of the absence of any regional rival, Britain was also involved in the war 
in Circassia. Russia’s advance to the south made Britain uneasy about the security of 
the Indian route. Besides the developments in the territories of the Ottoman Empire, 
the developments in Iran and the Caucasus were also affecting the relations of the 
two greatest imperial powers of the time. These years also witnessed a few British 
adventurers in the Caucasus. To what extent the British government had a role in 
those attempts has no clear answer. However, ambiguous (or covert) policy of 
Britain convinced Russians that all the events against the Russian interests in the 
second half of the 1830s were all the results of the British propaganda and 
conspiracy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Ibid, p. 121. 
37 Esadze, p. 38. 
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B. The International Environment in the Near East after the Treaty of 
Edirne  
After the Vienna Congress of 1815 Russia was a victorious, prestigious and 
powerful state maintaining the largest standing army in Europe. Thereafter, Russia 
would pursue two main objectives; ‘upholding a conservative cause in Europe’ for 
the preservation of the status quo, while adjusting the current situation in the Near 
East utilizing any opportunity to expand its influence.38  
 
In 1839, a daring reformation initiative had been put in effect in the Ottoman 
Empire. Yet the Ottoman Empire had to deal with the nationalist uprisings as well as 
Russia’s antagonistic policies. Sultan Mahmud II, the initiator of these reforms, faced 
the Greek uprising in 1820s.39 The uprising was suppressed with the help of Mehmed 
Ali Pasha, the Governor of Egypt. However, this was to be the beginning of new 
crises. A war with Russia, involvements of Britain and France and the resultant 
Treaty of Edirne, the crisis between Sultan Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali Pasha, and 
then the Straits question upon the resort of the Ottoman Empire to the help of Russia 
squeezed in a very short period of time when also the Circassian war was turning to 
be an international problem. 
                                                 
38 It was actually the Bosporus that Russia wanted to control with a motivation of a mixed hope and 
fear as Mosely puts down: “There was a hope that her Black Sea fleet, stationed only four days’ sail 
from the Bosphorus, would be able, at some moment of confusion in Constantinople and of disunion 
among the Powers, to seize the Straits. There was fear, sometimes inclining to deadly certainty, that 
this bold stroke would lead to a war against the rest of Europe.” Philip E. Mosely, Russian Diplomacy 
and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839 (Cambridge, 1934), p. 7. 
39 The first attempt of Greek revolution came with the help of Russia in 1821 in the boundaries of the 
Principalities under the leadership of Ypsilanti; however this first attempt was failed. Uprising 
continued in Mora. Although with the help of Mehmed Ali Pasha this uprising was suppressed, the 
involvement of the European powers resulted in the destruction of the Egyptian fleet and the 
penetration of the Russian forces in the Principalities. While with a few subsequent protocols in 
London Greeks attained their independence, the Treaty of Edirne also showed the total end of the 
sovereignty of the Sultan in the Caucasus as a result of the loss of the Circassian coasts.  
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 In these circumstances a year after the merciless suppression of the Polish 
revolt of 1832, a very surprising demand from the Ottoman Empire came to the 
Russian capital: the Ottoman Empire asked Russia’s military support against the 
rebellious Mehmed Ali Pasha, who had defeated the Ottoman army in Konya, and 
was marching to Istanbul.40 Russia sent help to the Ottoman capital, but not without 
compensation. The same year on 8 July 1833, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian 
Empire signed the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi, according to which the Ottoman 
Empire promised to close the straits to the European battleships when Russia would 
be engaged in a war.41 No doubt, suppression of the Polish revolt and the emergence 
of the Egyptian question during the first years of the 1830s changed the balance of 
power in favor of Russia threatening the British interests.  
 
After concluding such an agreement with Russia, it would not be surprising to 
expect from the Ottoman Empire a more docile policy regarding the Russian and 
Caucasian matters. The Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi was perceived as the ratification of 
Russia’s suzerainty over the Ottoman Empire by Britain and France.42 It was also 
accepted as a great defeat of the British foreign policy in the Near Eastern matters.43 
                                                 
40 Being deprived of his fleet in Navarino during the Greek uprising, and the silence of Sultan 
Mahmud II about his promises of nomination of the governorship of Damascus and Adana to Mehmed 
Ali Pasha resulted in an internal war between the central authority and the governor of Egypt. 
Ottoman Empire without any efficient army after the abolishment of the janissary corps could not stop 
the Egyptian forces. Under the command of İbrahim Pasha Egyptian army triumphed in the battle of 
Konya, which opened the road to Istanbul. In these circumstances, Sultan Mahmud II felt it necessary 
to resort for a foreign aid. Not having received a positive reply from Britain to protect Istanbul, he 
reluctantly resorted to the help of the Russian Empire. As a result, for the first and the last time 
Russian navy entered the Bosphorus. As a result of the Russian and French mediation a settlement 
established between Sultan Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali Pasha at Kütahya, according to which the 
Ottoman Empire granted the governorship of Suriye and Adana to Mehmed Ali Pasha’s son İbrahim 
Pasha.  
41 Erim, pp. 293-299. 
42 Prince Adam Czartoryski wrote to Zamoyski: “Turkey is now just a Russian province – what is 
more wanted?” He suggested to Palmerston ‘a strong common stand of the Western Powers against 
Russia.’ Marian Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity 1770-1861 (Princeton, 1955), p. 229.  
43 John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain (Massachusetts, 1950), p. 146. 
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Suspicions of the existence of the secret clauses of the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi fed 
antagonism against Russia in Britain. 
 
Russia’s control over Poland, the involvement in the Greek revolution, and the 
Egyptian question, as well as the secret clause of the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi all 
convinced the British politicians that Russia was enlarging and strengthening against 
the British interests. The question was whether the fate of the Ottoman Empire would 
resemble that of Poland or not. However, for Britain the Ottoman Empire was too 
important to be sacrificed. Gleason very well portrays the effect of the Treaty of 
Hünkar İskelesi to the British policy-making: 
 
If the conclusion of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi produced a revolution in 
English policy toward Russia and Turkey, it constituted a landmark not so 
much because at the moment of its signature Russia enjoyed greater power 
in Constantinople than at any other time, as because the implications of the 
treaty satisfied the foreign office that Russia was pursuing a policy 
carefully calculated to secure for herself the ultimate possession of the 
European portion of the Ottoman Empire.44 
 
As Temperley claims, “Unkiar Skelessi is a true turning-point in the attitude of 
English statesmen towards Russia.” After 1833, Britain would pursue a more 
cautious policy in the Near Eastern affairs not to lose any opportunity to prevent 
further Russian profits and to reverse the Russian gains. As the Treaty of Hünkar 
İskelesi showed that inactive policies in the Near East would harm the British 
interests, thereafter, Britain tried to pursue a more active policy till the conclusions of 
the Treaty of Balta Limanı in 1838 and the Treaty of London in 1840, which 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
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established the commercial preponderance of Britain over the Ottoman Empire, and 
reset the balances in the Near East along the lines of the British objectives.45  
 
In 1833, strengthened its position in the Near East, Russia was hereafter more 
determined to suppress the North-Caucasus. However, there were difficulties for 
Russia: first and foremost Circassia was terra incognita for the Russians; second, as 
the Circassians became aware of the Russian threat they started to unite (they gave 
oaths not to trade with Russians, etc.); and third, Britain showed off itself as a 
participant of the game in Circassia. What is more, by then intensive activities of the 
Polish émigrés and the Circassian missions were visible. 
 
 
C. British involvements in the Caucasus in 1830s and the activities of 
Zanoko Sefer Bey  
 
No doubt, Circassia so much attracted the interest of the British public opinion 
in the second half of the 1830s with the print of Portfolio, the Vixen affair and 
journeys of David Urquhart, James Stanislaus Bell, John Longworth, and Edmund 
                                                 
45 Temperley discusses the effect of the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi to the British policy-making as well 
as the public opinion. Harold Temperley, England and the Near East. The Crimea (London, 1964), 
pp. 69-78. 
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Spencer to Circassia.46 By the end of 1837, Russophobia was a major part of the 
English opinion, for which David Urquhart47 was mostly responsible. 
 
During nineteenth century, the British government sent missions, amongst 
David Urquhart would be the most popular one, to the Near East about commercial 
opportunities. While the driving force of the Russo-British rivalry was desires and 
plans of two imperialist powers, rendering the calculations of Britain as only 
protection of the route to India would not be adequate. Near Eastern countries were 
providing a huge market for the British goods.48 British exports to the Ottoman 
Empire would increase by 800 per cent between 1825 and 1852.49 Not only the trade 
with the Ottoman Empire, but also the trade with Iran, the Caucasus, and even Russia 
was considered and evaluated in the foreign policy circles of Britain.50 In this 
connection in 1830s, Anglo-Russian trade was becoming less significant, and 
commercial treaties were being negotiated with Turkey and Austria. On the other 
                                                 
46 These British adventurers wrote books about the Circassian resistance and their residences in 
Circassia, which are so valuable for the Circassian history, while we learn many details about 
Circassia of that time from these books, as a result of the lack of written literature among the 
Circassians. John Longworth, A Year Among Circassians (1837-38) (Two volumes) (London, 1840); 
J. S. Bell, Journal of a Residence in Circassia 1836, 1837, 1838 (Two volumes ) (London, 1840); 
Edmund Spencer, Travels in Circassia, Krim-Tartary, etc. (Two volumes) (London,  1839); Captain 
Spencer, Turkey, Russia, the Black Sea, and Circassia (London, 1854). 
47 David Urquhart was a Scot, an ardent Turcophil and an expert of the Near Eastern matters. After his 
visit to the Caucasus in 1834, he acted as an advocate and spokesman of the Caucasians in the West. 
He was admired and backed by Sir Herbert Taylor, the King’s private secretary, and his writings 
greatly appreciated by the King William IV. He published the polemical journal Portfolio, and wrote 
several books about the importance of the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus, as well as the Russian 
threat against the British interests. Gleason, p. 146. 
48 In his note, General Raevskiy complained about the establishment of a company of the British 
merchants in Trabzon: “This Company captured the whole trade in the Asia minor and Iran. Like 
other British companies it tries to be influential upon the political affairs of these countries”. “Note of 
General Raevskiy about trade with the mountaineers and immigration to the western coast”, 
Proceedings of the Caucasian Archaeographical Commission, 1866-1904 [Akty Sobrannyi 
Kavkazskoiu Arheograficheskoiu Kommissieiu, 12 Volumes, (Tiflis, 1885), hereafter to be cited as 
AKAK], Vol. IX, p. 474. 
49 Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War 1853-1856 (London, 1999), p. 7. 
50 Interestingly, while Russia was uneasy about the policies of Britain against its quarantine along the 
Eastern Black Sea coast, it bought British steamers to strengthen the quarantine. Luxenburg, p. 142. 
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hand, it was obvious that British goods would not drive into the territories under the 
Russian rule as easy as it entered into a territory under the British influence.51 
 
David Urquhart’s visit to Circassia in 1834 was important for the future British 
involvements in Circassia. He had a mission to research the resources of Turkey, 
especially those which could be bought from Turkey instead of Russia Before his 
arrival to Istanbul he became famous with his book Turkey and its Resources.52  
 
Encouraged by Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Urquhart 
with Captain W. Lyons53, the captain of a private ship named Turquoise, started a 
journey on the Black Sea.54 During his visit to Samsun, Urquhart met Zanoko Sefer 
Bey who was at that time organizing “the illegal trade” between Turkey and 
Circassia. While Captain Lyons and Urquhart visited Circassia with reference letters 
of Sefer Bey, shortly after this meeting Sefer Bey went to Istanbul to get the support 
of the European powers for the Circassian cause. His residence in the British 
Embassy in Istanbul demonstrated his close relations with the British diplomatic 
circles.55  
 
Lord Ponsonby wrote to the Foreign Ministry that it was time to support the 
Circassians, as he thought that the Circassian war was a part of the Eastern Question 
                                                 
51 Gleason, p. 170; According to Raevskiy the British Company in Trabzon did not want a Russian 
control over Circassia, because the British merchants were trying to enter the Circassian market. 
AKAK, Vol. IX, Note of General Raevskiy, p. 474. 
52 He received from the Secret Service 200 sterlin, and from the Foreign Office budget 300 sterlin for 
this mission. Luxenburg, p. 92.  
See, David Urquhart, Turkey and Its Resources (London, 1833). 
53 He would participate to the Crimean War as an admiral of the British navy. 
54 After a residence of 3 days in Circassia Urquhart returned to Istanbul, and presented a report to 
Ponsonby. After receiving this report Ponsonby stated that Urquhart’s visit would be the start of great 
developments. Genotsid Adygov, p. 79. 
55 “From Baron Wrangel to Baron Rosen, 16 [28]  August 1835”, AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 890; “From 
Baron Rosen to Graf Nesselrode, 31 October [12 November] 1835”, AKAK, Vol. VIII, pp. 891-892.  
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and the balance of power.56 In one of his reports, Ponsonby stated that he had sent a 
message to Circassia about the establishment of a government and the announcement 
of an independence declaration.57 He also pointed out that the invasion of the 
Caucasus would yield more power to Russia than the suppression of Poland.58 
However, the Foreign Ministry refused Ponsonby’s claims on the necessity of 
rendering support to Circassia.59 Palmerston thought that the Circassians could not 
resist long; therefore, British monetary and military help would be useless. British 
aid would not only exacerbate the relations between Russia and Britain, but also 
would lengthen the war and increase the pain.60  
 
On the other hand, encouraged by the success of his previous pamphlets, 
Urquhart undertook the publication of the Portfolio61 in 1835 and established a 
junction between his cause and that of Poland. From Prince Adam Czartoryski and 
his nephew Zamoyski, he obtained the copies of the Russian diplomatic 
correspondences, extracted from the archives in Warsaw during the revolution. 
During the summer of 1836, Stewart, a fellow conspirator, went to Circassia and 
distributed the copies of the Portfolio.62 
 
Russian government was well aware of the activities of Ponsonby, Urquhart, 
and Sefer Bey. The Russian documents within the years 1835-1837, demonstrate the 
uneasiness of Russia about the Britain-Circassian relations, and especially Zanoko 
Sefer’s influence over Circassia from the Ottoman territories. According to the 
                                                 
56 Luxenburg, p. 96. 
57 Ibid, p. 98. 
58 Ibid, p. 100. 
59 Ibid, p. 101. 
60 Ibid. 
61 The Portfolio first published in November 1835 with the print of Russian documents. Russians 
suspected that Palmerston was behind this periodical. 
62 Gleason, p. 191. 
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Russian government, it was the rumors spreading in Circassia by Sefer Bey’s letters 
via the British adventurers and the Turkish merchants that caused the continuation of 
the Circassian war. In order to prevent the activities of Zanoko Sefer Bey, Russia 
contacted to Osman Pasha, Trabzon Serasker. Baron Rosen wrote to Osman Pasha: 
 
This friendship itself and as well as the agreement existing between two 
powers makes me to turn to you with the request to take measures for 
retention of Sefer Bey from the frequent relations with the people subject to 
us, living on the Eastern Shores of the Black Sea. He is confusing the minds 
with his letters promising that very soon the Sultan will come with a strong 
army and fleet.63  
 
Osman Pasha expressed his willingness to collaborate; however, he claimed 
that Sefer Bey was not in Trabzon but was living in Istanbul in the British Embassy 
now. 
 
Sefer Bey now lives with the British Ambassador in Constantinople, but as 
soon as he returns I will apply the strictest rules for him.64  
 
During the fall of 1835, Baron Rosen repeatedly claimed the necessity of the 
removal of Sefer Bey from Istanbul and Black Sea coasts of Anatolia, from where he 
could get into contact with the Englishmen and the Circassians: 
 
I think it will be useful for us, if our envoy in Constantinople manages to 
make the Porte completely take away Sefer Bey from the influence of the 
Europeans, and more necessarily from Trabzon and Constantinople whence 
he will always have the capability to communicate with the mountaineers 
and to harm us with his appeals.65  
 
                                                 
63 Baron Rosen continued to say that the Circassians naively believed such words and this situation 
increased their pain while the war brought them poverty as the Russian army was destroying 
Circassia. He concluded his letter with stating the necessity to prevent the activities of the merchants 
who were conducting secret trade with the mountaineers.  “From Baron Rosen to Serasker of Trabzon, 
29 June [11 July] 1835” AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 887. 
64 “Report of Baron Wrangel to Baron Rosen, 16 [28] August 1835” AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 890.  
65 “From Baron Rosen to Rodofinkin, 4 [16] September 1835” AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 891.  
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In his reply to Rosen, Nesselrode stated that Butenev, the Russian ambassador 
in Istanbul, was instructed to use all possible means to prevent harmful activities of 
Sefer Bey. He also gave the essence of the dispatch of Butenev, according to which 
the Reisulküttab promised to take the necessary steps against the rumors distributed 
by Sefer Bey.66 While, according to Butenev, Sefer Bey was not powerful enough to 
be harmful for the best interests of Russia, Baron Rosen had absolutely the opposite 
view. In a dispatch sent from Veliaminov, the commander of the forces of the 
Caucasian Line, to Baron Rosen it was written that this year the Shapsughs and 
Natukhays were more committed to resist as a result of the promises of Sefer Bey 
about the forthcoming help of the Egyptian Pasha, the Sultan, England, and France. 
What is more, Sefer Bey sent 80 barrels of gunpowder to Batum, which he received 
via British Embassy. Rosen claimed:  
 
... Sefer Bey does not live in an uncertainty as our [Russian] ambassador in 
Constantinople wrote, but he uses the special position of the mission of the 
Great Britain, which can be claimed to support his harmful actions against 
us.67  
 
As a result of the Russian coercive diplomacy, he was forced to live out of 
Istanbul to prevent his relations with the Circassian missions and the Europeans. 
Butenev answered Baron Rosen’s request for expelling Sefer Bey from Istanbul with 
a favorable news: “… according to the personal order of Sultan, Sefer Bey in these 
                                                 
66 “Sefer Bey actually lived a certain time in Samsun on the northern shore of Anatolia, and then met 
here with Captain Lyons when he was sailing in the Black Sea in 1834. Afterwards he came to 
Constantinople where he has been living for one year. There he actually used the benevolence of the 
British Embassy. However, in Constantinople he wasted all his resources, and now lives in uncertainty 
with his several compatriots settled similarly in Constantinople. Although Butenev does not assume 
Sefer Bey in the present situation as harmful for us, it will be useful for the friendly relations between 
Russia and the Porte to report Reisülküttab about the intrigues of Sefer Bey to put an end to those 
activities. … Reisülküttab promised to take the necessary steps to assure justice about the spread of 
rumors of Sefer Bey, and now will take measures against the mountaineer.” “From Graf Nesselrode to 
Baron Rosen, 24 January [5 February] 1836”, AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 892.  
67 “From Baron Rosen to Graf Nesselrode, 14 [26] July 1836”, AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 893. 
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days was exiled to Pazarcık (near Filippopoli)...”68 In another letter, Butenev claimed 
that from now on any contact with Sefer Bey could only be conducted with great 
difficulty. According to Butenev, not only Sefer Bey, but also the Circassian deputies 
in Istanbul were in a miserable situation economically.69 
 
 In 1838, Sefer Bey was permitted to return to Istanbul.70 However, in 1838 he 
was assigned to Meğri county in the Gelibolu province as a voyvoda.71 According to 
the Ottoman archives, a few years later, Sefer Bey was in Edirne.72 Then as a reply to 
his request he was transferred to Zağra-i Atik [Staro Zagora in today’s Bulgaria].73 
Before the Crimean War, he was again in Edirne.74 However, in a nutshell, his exile 
in Rumelia continued till the Crimean War, which demonstrated the Ottoman policy 
to preserve friendly relations with Russia by removing Sefer Bey from the sight. 
 
Even though he was exiled from Istanbul, Sefer Bey continued to meet with the 
Circassian delegates, and to send letters to encourage resistance. In August 1836, the 
representatives of the Shapsughs, Natukhays, and Jigets came to Istanbul. Sefer Bey, 
though in exile, was able to meet them. Having the representatives returned, the 
Circassians made a meeting near the river Atakum in January 1837.75 At this 
meeting, the Circassians accepted Sefer Bey’s advices to continue to resist. At that 
                                                 
68 It was Tatarpazarcık near Filibe. “From Butenev to Baron Rosen, 6 [18] October 1836”, AKAK, 
Vol. VIII, pp. 893-894. 
69“From Butenev to Baron Rosen, 8 [20] March 1837”, AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 894. 
70 BOA C.DH, Dosya No.:  2413, 27 Zilkade 1253 [22 March 1838]. 
71 “From the Vâli of Edirne to Sadaret, 27 Rebiulevvel 1254 [20 June 1838]”, BOA HAT, Dosya No.: 
58100. 
72 BOA İ.DH, Dosya No.: 31, Gömlek No.: 1475, 6 Zilkade 1256 [29 January 1841] 
73 BOA HR.MKT, Dosya No.: 7, Gömlek No.: 10, 29 Safer 1260 [20 March 1844]. 
74  BOA İ.DH, Dosya No.: 282, Gömlek No.: 17709, 7 Muharrem 1270 [10 October 1853]. 
75 In Circassia the names of the places were drawn generally from the rivers, and therefore when 
pointing out a place it was enough to give the name of the river. 
 32
time, Bell was also in Circassia, and shortly afterwards Longworth and Sefer Bey’s 
messenger Nago İsmail came.76  
 
Besides the activities of Sefer Bey, another matter that bothered the Russian 
government was the British adventurers in the Circassian mountains. After the arrival 
of James Bell and John Longworth, Raevskiy also reported about the alleged British 
agents of, Marrin and Iddo, who came to Circassia with two ships full of arms. 
According to this report, Captain Marrin and the Polish Polinsky swore to return the 
Caucasus again with Longworth.77  
 
The fact that those adventurers were not prevented, if not encouraged, by the 
British government to act in Circassia promoted the belief in Russia that they were 
the agents of the British government. However, the British Government and the 
Foreign Office were very careful in their actions and attitudes towards Russia. 
Nonetheless, the anti-Russian circles in Britain, which also enjoyed the sympathy of 
the King William IV, fostered the Russian anxiety that the British Foreign Office 
was intervening in Russia’s internal matters. The British ambassadors in Istanbul 
also harbored similar views to those of the Russophobic society in Britain. Ponsonby 
and Stratford Canning enjoyed not only special influence and respect in Turkey, but 
at the same time they had undeniable pro-Turkish and anti-Russian tendencies.78 
                                                 
76 “From Golovin to Chernyshev, 6 [18] May 1838, report of General Raevskiy on 8 [20] April AKAK, 
Vol. IX, p. 454.  
77 "Report from General-adjutant Lazarev to Baron Rosen, 24 November [6 December] 1837”, AKAK, 
Vol. VIII; “From Golovin to Chernyshev”, AKAK, Vol. IX, p. 453. 
78 “Stratford, it is true, was more deeply committed to the Turks than Palmerston; he may had personal 
animus against the Czar… If Palmerston was distrustful of Russia, Lord Ponsonby at Constantinople 
was still more so.” Temperley, pp. 74-75. 
For the influence of Stratford Canning, British ambassador in Istanbul from 1842 to 1857 with only 
short intervals, over the Ottoman court and government see E. F. Malcolm-Smith. Though the author 
seems to exaggerate Canning’s influence, yet the book gives clues of the dependence of the Ottoman 
government to Britain, especially during the periods when Russian pressure and threat acute. The 
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They thought that the profits of Britain lied in the protection of the well-being of the 
Ottoman Empire, and the prevention of the future Russian expansion. In this context, 
the independence of Circassia was essential to prevent the Russian advance.79  
 
On the other hand, the official view and declarations of the British government 
cannot be regarded as anti-Russian.80 There seems to be a clash between the views of 
the British Foreign Minister Palmerston and the British ambassador Ponsonby in 
Istanbul. Palmerston, in all his acts, tried to abstain from any conflict with Russia 
without getting the support of Austria and France. On the other hand, Ponsonby and 
Urquhart supported a more active policy for the protection of the Indian route. They 
believed that, if Circassia fell, then the Ottoman lands would come to the fore. 
Therefore, not only the Russian expansion should be prevented, but also a powerful 
Turkey should be restored for the future benefits of Britain.  
 
After the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi and with the publication of Portfolio while 
the Russo-British relations were getting worse, a new crisis popped up with the 
seizure of the British schooner Vixen81 by the Russian naval forces. Before the Vixen 
affair with two incidents Russia and Britain checked each other, and finally, in 1836, 
                                                                                                                                          
author mentions that Canning was known as the Padishah of the Padishah. E. F. Malcolm-Smith, The 
Life of Stratford Canning. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (London, 1933). 
79 Temperley, pp. 75-76. 
80 When Prince Czartoryski demanded support for the Circassian war from Palmerston in 1839, he 
answered that “… John Bull [the British people] will not go to war to save the Circassians.” Kukiel, p. 
240. 
81 It was Urquhart’s plan, who was now secretary of the British Embassy in Istanbul. A ship was to be 
sent under the British flag loaded with supplies to the Circassians. As the Russian annexation of the 
part of the coast near Soğucak was not recognized by the British government, Britain’s right of trading 
freely with the inhabitants would be attained by a fait accompli. A schooner owned by George and 
Stanley Bell was used for this purpose. The schooner was officially loaded with salt; however there 
were also ammunition and arms. Ibid, p. 237. 
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Russia’s precautions of strengthening the blockade along the Eastern Black Sea 
coasts resulted in a crisis.82   
 
From the very beginning Britain was uneasy about Russia’s blockade along the 
Eastern shores of the Black Sea. On 19 August 1835, Ponsonby wrote to the Foreign 
Minister Palmerston that this blockade was giving great damage to the British 
trade.83 However, though Britain was persisting in not recognizing Russia’s claims 
over Circassia, it also did not want to involve in any serious conflict with Russia. In 
this connection, although both Palmerston and Ponsonby were informed about the 
Vixen initiative, they both avoided any commitment without insisting upon the 
cancellation of the expedition. Laden with 100 tones of salt and sailed towards the 
Caucasian coasts, Vixen was seized near Sucukkale on November 1836 by the 
Russian brig Ajax, and was confiscated.84 A sharp diplomatic conflict pursued, and 
war seemed as a possibility in 1837. However, Britain did not want to bring the 
matter to a bitter conflict, and accepted the right of Russia’s quarantine along the 
coasts. This did not mean that Russia’s rule in Circassia was overall recognized, but 
it was really a diplomatic success of Russia, which fostered the Russophobia in 
Britain. 
                                                 
82 Actually, after the Treaty of Edirne there occurred two previous incidents that might have resulted 
with such a crisis. The first incident was the travel of an English warship Blonde along the Black Sea 
coasts for two weeks in the very end of 1829 shortly afterwards the Treaty of Edirne. It was under the 
initiative of the Ambassador of Britain in Istanbul Robert Gordon, and contrary to the directives of the 
foreign minister Lord Aberdeen. However, Captain Lyons was very well received by Count 
Vorontsov, and this incident did not cause any negative result in terms of Russo-British relations. 
Luxenburg, pp. 77-79.  
However, for Russian Empire, which did not wait any foreign intervention after concluding the Treaty 
of Edirne it was a shocking act, and led Russia to act more carefully to prevent repetition of such an 
initiative against the immunity of the Russia’s preponderance in the Black Sea. The other incident was 
the seizure of the schooner of Lord Charles Spencer by the Russians; however this also did not result 
in a crisis.  
83 Ibid, p. 109. 
84 “From Baron Rosen to Chernyshev, 24 December 1836 [5 January 1837]”, AKAK, Vol. XIII, p. 
859.  
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The Russian government was well aware that these British adventurers played 
a significant role in uniting the Circassians. However, this awareness caused 
exaggerations about the British involvements in the Caucasus to some extent. In 
Russia, there was some kind of xenophobia for the external involvements in its 
affairs. Being an autocratic and an ambitious imperialist state, and having at the same 
time many internal difficulties with uncertain and problematic boundaries, Russia 
became very sensitive to any kind of foreign intervention. Russia’s reactions to the 
British or Ottoman contacts with the mountaineers of the Caucasus seemed to be a 
result of this mood. However, the uneasiness of the Russian government about the 
British involvements did not produce any important crises with the exception of the 
Vixen affair. According to Luxenburg, Russia was unwilling to turn the issue into an 
international matter, and to solve its “internal affair” by using its own means and 
methods.85  
 
 
D. The Polish Role in the Russo-Circassian War 
 
The Polish question, being a part of the Eastern Question and more importantly 
owing to the roles of Poles in the Russo-Circassian War, should also be added to the 
analysis of the Russo-Circassian war. Poland, which was partitioned by Russia, 
Prussia and Austria, in the second half of the eighteenth century was mainly under 
the Russian rule. After the 1830 revolt the Poles were suppressed harshly by the 
Russian government. However, this uprising established a special link between the 
Polish patriots and the Caucasian mountaineers. Thousands of Poles were sent to the 
                                                 
85 Luxenburg, pp. 108-109. 
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battlefields in Caucasus by the Russian government. Of course they were not the 
most devoted soldiers of Russia, and many of them fled and participated in the 
Caucasian resistance.86 Many of the Polish captives also were sold as slaves to the 
Ottoman Empire. The village Adampol near Istanbul was established by those former 
slaves with the help of the Ottoman government and the Polish Diaspora in Europe. 
87 This small village that was founded by the men who cherished the ideal of an 
independent Poland was destined to play an interesting role in the struggle for the 
independence of Circassia.88  
 
After the suppression of the Polish uprising in 1831 including Prince Adam 
Czartoryski, the President of the National Government, thousands of Poles fled from 
Poland. Czartoryski, after a short stay in London, resided in Paris where he 
conducted his political activities. Named after the hotel where he chose as his 
political headquarter, the circle of Polish nationalists was called “Hotel Lambert”.89 
Istanbul was also another center for Polish nationalists. In order to observe and 
evaluate the developments in Istanbul, the Polish immigrants there established the 
Eastern Agency (Şark Ajansı). The head of the Eastern Agency was Michal 
Czaykowski.90 According to Czartoryski, a war between Russia and the Great 
                                                 
86 “From Butenev to Baron Rosen, 8 [20] March 1837”, AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 895; A. H. Kasumov, H. 
A. Kasumov, “Osvoboditelnaia borba adigskih narodov v XIX veke”, p. 51; according to Teophil 
Lapinskiy, a Polish soldier who lived among the Circassians during 1857-1860, in Circassia there 
were about 4 thousand deserters who were mainly Russians during 1857-59. T. V. Polovinkina, 
Cherkesiia – bol moia (Maikop, 1999), p. 140. 
87 Jerzy S. Latka, Lehistan’dan Gelen Sefirler: Türkiye-Polonya İlişkilerinin Altı Yüzyılı, translated by 
Antoni and Nalan Sarkady (İstanbul, no date). 
88 For an overall summary of the Polish-Circassian relations from 1830-1864 see, Stefaniia Skochen, 
“19. Yüzyıldaki Polonya-Kuzey Kafkasya İlişkileri”, Tarih ve Toplum, Vol. 29, No.: 174 (June 1998), 
pp. 55-59.  
89 Ibid, p. 21. After Czartoryski bought the old Hotel Lambert on the Ile-St.-Louis in 1843, this place 
not only became his home but also the seat of his political affairs, his wife’s charitable activities and 
educational institutions. Kukiel, p. 227. 
90 He was a soldier, novelist, and politician from Ukrainian descent. Very soon he won popularity and 
influence in the Ottoman Empire. Later he became Muslim and took the name Mehmed Sadık Efendi 
(later Sadık Pasha) Kukiel, 245; see also Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “Michal Czajkowski’s Cossack Project 
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Powers of the Europe was inevitable in the near future as a result of the Eastern 
Question. Therefore, the Polish nationalists always supported a powerful Ottoman 
Empire and an independent Circassia as a prerequisite for their aim of an 
independent Poland.  
 
There was a steady flow of Polish soldiers escaping from the Russian army to 
join the Circassian war. However, many of the fugitives were treated as other slaves 
captured from the ranks of the Russian army, and sold to Turks. While the Polish 
agents were trying to free them from slavery, the problem of their settlement in the 
Ottoman territory was solved by the foundation of Adampol [current day 
Polonezköy] on the Asian side of Istanbul. The situation of the Poles in Turkey was 
well-known by the Hotel Lambert. Via Lazarist priests those slaves coming from 
Circassia was bought and then freed, however those coming directly from Russia had 
no documents, therefore they should be yielded to Russia back according to the 
Küçük Kaynarca agreement. To solve these problems Czaykowki agreed with 
Lazarist priests for establishment of a Polish village in the lands of the Lazarists in 
the Çingene Konak. In 3 March 1842 it was agreed that the Poles would 
accommodate in the Çingene Konak as renters. This village was called Adampol 
from the first name of Czartoryski. This plan, which was against the Russian interest, 
and which was not under the control of the British officials got the support of the 
French Embassy in Istanbul. French gave the citizenship to those members of the 
village as the East Agency members. By this way Poles were now under a diplomatic 
protection, and there was not any reason to be given back to Russia. 
                                                                                                                                          
During the Crimean War: An Analysis of Ideas”, Essays in Modern Ukrainian History, edited by 
Peter L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton, 1987). 
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Adampol was a very suitable place to act against Russia with its very 
geography. Situated in deep forest, Polish residents of Adampol could prepare 
themselves for an imminent war against Russia. There also lived Kazimierz Gordon, 
an expert of explosives, who established a laboratory of explosives in order to 
produce bombs to be used in Circassia. Adampol was both a wonderful place of 
preparation for the war in the Caucasus for the Poles, and as well as a rest place for 
them.91 
 
The revolt in Circassia and Georgia, if supported and supplied with arms and 
equipment, seemed to provide an opportunity for decreasing Russia’s military power 
and checking the Russian pressure in the Near East. Since several thousands of 
former Polish soldiers had been dispatched by the Russian government to the 
Caucasus to serve with Russian troops, there was some possibility of organizing 
mass desertions and of inciting the Poles in the Caucasus. For this purpose, in 1835, 
a Polish mission was sent to the Caucasus, and links were established between Prince 
Czartoryski and the Circassian mountaineers.92 This special bond with the Poles and 
the Circassians would continue to the very end of the Circassian war. 
 
 
E. Circassia in 1840s: Russian Quarantine, Circassian Assault, Zanoko 
Sefer Bey and Muhammed Emin’s activities  
 
The hearsay about new adventurers among the Russian diplomatic circles 
continued in 1839. Butenev claimed that he received news from Lazarev that a few 
                                                 
91 Latka, pp. 24-30. 
92 Kukiel, p. 236. 
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British engineers left Istanbul for Samsun from where they would go to the 
Circassian mountains. He also warned that a British trade steamer named Robert 
under the control of Skipper Pratt, loaded with weapons would come to Circassia 
soon.93  
 
However, Russian official correspondence about the secret deals of 
Englishmen did not continue in 1840s. Similarly, from 1840s on till the Crimean 
War, Caucasian matters very rarely appeared in the British correspondences.94 In a 
correspondence in 1843, Canning was warned by the Foreign Office not to encourage 
the Circassian delegates, and he was even instructed to prevent the Circassians to 
come to Britain.95 This message clearly demonstrates the change in the British policy 
in regard to the Near East and particularly to following the solutions of the Egyptian 
and Straits problems. The signature of the Straits Convention in July 1841 
inaugurated a new and significantly different chapter in the Anglo-Russian relations 
and in the British opinion about the Russian Empire. Their cooperation in settling the 
Straits question not only reduced the Russian threat against the British interests, but 
also the Russophobia among the British public.  
 
After Sefer Bey was pacified and relations with Britain were normalized, 
Russia resumed its efforts to conclude the war in Circassia. However, Russia was in 
a search of new strategies to pacify the Circassians during 1839 and 1840, and the 
role of trade was also under discussion. 
 
                                                 
93 “From Butenev to Golovin, 7 [19] March 1839”, AKAK, Vol. IX, pp. 458-459. 
94 Luxenburg, p. 237. 
95 Ibid, pp. 237-238.  
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As mentioned earlier, Russia established several fortifications along the 
Circassian coast to prevent the contact of the Circassians with other countries. Thus, 
Russia took pains to blockade the entire Black Sea coastline, which served as points 
of commercial contacts for the Circassians, now was trying to be isolated. During 
1838 and 1839, Russia completed several fortifications: in Sochi Alexandria (later 
Navaginsk), in Tuapse Veliaminovsk, in Psezuape Lazarevsk, in Sucukkoy Bay 
Novorossiysk, and near the river Shahe Golovinsk fortifications. In order to provide 
a secure communication between the Black Sea coastal military line and Kuban, the 
fortress of Raevskiy, which connected Anapa and Novorossiysk, and the fortresses of 
Gostagaevsk and Varenivkovsk fortifications near Kuban were established. Thereby 
the establishment of the Black Sea Coast Military Line was concluded.96  
 
According to Raevskiy with the completion of the Black Sea coastal military 
line the number of the Turkish vessels arriving in Circassia was now less than one 
tenth of the previous years.97 Besides, Russia also completely changed the nature of 
the economic order in Circassia, which prevailed in the Ottoman times. Before the 
Russian conquest only in the Sucukkale there had been 150 Turkish shops, which 
                                                 
96 In the meantime of 1831-39 the following fortifications were established in the Black Sea shores:  
In the mouth of river Doba to the South of Sucuk Bay fortress of Kabardinsk         
In the mouth of river Pshad fortress of Novotroitsk    
In the mouth of river Sochi fortress of Navaginsk 
In the mouth of river Bulana fortress of Mihailovsk   
In the mouth of river Shahe fortress of Golovinsk 
In the mouth of river Tuapse fortress of Veliaminovsk  
In the mouth of river Psezuape fortress of Lazarevsk 
In the mouth of river Shapsuho fortress of Tenginsk  
In the mouth of river Meskage fortress of Raevsk 
In the mouth of river Tsemes fortress of Novorossiysk  
In the Gelincik Bay fortress of Gelincik 
Gardanov, p. 120. 
The residence of the commander of the Black Sea Coast Line was Kerch. Esadze, p. 35. Esadze 
explains the wars with the Circassians during the establishment of these fortresses. Esadze, pp. 45-55. 
For a well-detailed discussion of the Russian Black Sea coastline and the motives behind its 
establishment, see, A. Soht, "Chernomorskaia beregovaia liniia: sushchnost i funktsii", Rossiia i 
Cherkesiia (vtoraia polovina XVIII - XIX vv.) (Maykop, 1995), pp. 138-165.  
97 Polovinkina, p. 123. 
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provided all the necessary goods for mountaineers. Until the Russian occupation of 
Anapa, there were 60 villages, where only merchants lived. Raevskiy claimed that 
Russians destroyed about 50 villages and markets located in Tsemes and Gelincik.98  
 
Nonetheless, Turkish merchants with small boats or vessels continued their 
trade with Circassia in spite of the Russian threat.99 After the Treaty of Edirne, this 
trade not only became much more dangerous but also more profitable, which 
encouraged the Turkish merchants to continue their dealings.100 On the other hand, 
the slave trade, which continued to be one of the important aspects of the Ottoman 
social life, could not cease immediately.101 According to Gardanov, the slave trade 
also linked the Circassian feudals to the Ottoman Empire, as it was the main source 
of their wealth.102 What is more, the Circassian immigrants in the Ottoman territories 
were also involved in the Circassian trade.103  
 
Failure in stopping the trade between the Ottoman Empire and Circassia led 
Russia to develop different strategies. In 1839, General Raevskiy suggested the 
construction of markets under the control of the Russian army in the places where 
Turkish merchants were frequently visiting. According to this plan, at first Turkish 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
99 In 1830, from Turkey 200 Turkish and British ships came to the Circassian coasts. Ibid.  
In 1832, Russians sold 15 Turkish ships, which were captured when they were trading with 
Circassians. Russian military forces destroyed in 1833 three and in 1835 two Turkish ships. In 1844 
twelve, in 1845 ten and in 1846 six Turkish ships were captured. Istoriia narodov severnogo Kavkaza 
(konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.), edited by A. L. Narochnitskii (Moscow, 1988), p. 180 footnote 10, and p. 
136. 
100 Istoriia narodov severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.), p. 132.   
101 A good description of the meaning and significance of the slave trade for the Circassians, see, 
George Leighton Ditson, Circassia or a Tour to the Caucasus (New York, 1850), pp. 189-193. Ditson 
compares the desire of Circassians to go to the Ottoman Empire as slaves with the wishes of the 
farmers of America to go to a bigger city to reach to the wealth. On the other hand, he also points out 
that without slave trade such a costly war with Russia could not be maintained. 
102 Gardanov, p. 114. 
103 370 Circassian families immigrated to the Black Sea coast of Anatolia. They were not only 
practicing farming but also conducting trade with the Caucasus. They were bringing slaves to sell in 
the Ottoman territory.  Genotsid Adygov, p. 86. 
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merchants would not pay tax; however, after the trade was well established, then 
Russia would apply tax. Raevskiy was suggesting Novorossiysk as a convenient 
place for such an initiative.104 With this scheme, Russia would not try to stop the 
female slave trade, but Russians would buy them in exchange for salt or money and 
marry them with Russian soldiers. Raevskiy received 20.000 rubles from the Russian 
government to conduct commercial relations with the mountaineers. Soon in all the 
fortresses salt trade started; however, the amount of salt, which was involved in this 
trade was not sufficient for the mountaineers.105 Anyway, Russian attempt to regulate 
the Russian-Circassian trade through a quarantine line of trading posts and salt 
magazines was unsuccessful. The value of the contraband trade was overwhelmingly 
higher than that of the official trade. 
 
Therefore, in the same year Russia reversed its policy completely and trade 
with Circassians was completely forbidden. The prohibition of trade and bad harvest 
brought a terrible hunger to the mountaineers in the winter. The Russian commanders 
categorically forbade the exchange of bread with the mountaineers.106 By doing so, 
they tried to bring the starving mountaineers to their kneels. Things did not go in that 
way, however. This policy caused great hatred against the Russians among the 
mountaineers, and any possibility of peaceful solution of the war again faded away. 
1840 was a landmark in the history of the Circassian resistance. While the Russians 
were planning to end the war in Circassia after their victory in Ahulgoh against 
Sheikh Shamil, the Circassians succeeded in capturing the fortresses Veliaminovsk, 
                                                 
104 “Report of Graf Chernyshev to General Golovin, 19 [31] October 1839”, AKAK, Vol. IX, pp. 461-
462. Actually there was a similar initiative in 1835. However, in that case, the Russian merchants 
instead o the Turkish ones were planned to conduct commercial relations with the mountaineers in the 
Russian garrisons. Istoriia narodov severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.), p. 180 footnote 
10. 
105 Polovinkina, p. 125. See, “Note of General Raevskiy”, AKAK, Vol. IX, pp. 470-480. 
106 Polovinkina, p. 125 
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Lazarevsk, Mikhailovsk, and Golovinsk in 1840. Struck by the famine resulting from 
an unusually harsh winter, and isolated from the outside world by the Russian 
cordon, feeling that they had nothing to lose, the Western Caucasians attacked with 
all their forces. In a few months the southern section of the Caucasian Black Sea 
Line was isolated.107 Russia’s humiliating situation in the Western Caucasus would 
also help Sheikh Shamil to reorganize his state after his defeat in Ahulgoh once 
more. In 1840, it became obvious that the end of the war in Caucasus could not be 
reached in the near future.  
 
In 1841, the Circassian tribes held a general congress in the village of Pshekha 
in the Abzekh lands with the participation of Ubykhs, Shapsughs, Abzekhs, and 
Natukhays. The aim of the gathering was the unification of all the Circassians in the 
war against Russia under the rules of the Shariat. It was resolved that no tribe was to 
enter into a separate agreement with the Russians.108 In the 1840s, the Circassians 
continued to storm the Black Sea coastal military line to preserve their trade and 
communication with the Ottoman Empire and Britain. In 1841, the Circassians 
stormed the forts of Tenginsk and Navaginsk. In 1844, about 7.000 Circassians 
stormed Golovinsk and Lazarevsk.109  
 
While war was continuing in Circassia with all its intensity and violence, 
isolated Sefer Bey was in a search of different strategies. While hoping of the break-
up of a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the near future, he was also 
                                                 
107 Tatlok, p. 102; Polovinkina, p. 126-127; According to Esadze, Circassians could not succeed to 
capture Golovinsk, and Natukhays trying to storm Abinsk fort near Kuban were heavily defeated in 
the same year. Esadze, pp. 55-62. 
108 A. D. Panesh, “Deiatelnost Hadji-Magometa i Suleimana-Efendia na Severo-zapadnom Kavkaze 
(1842-1846 gg.), Cherkesiia v XIX veke (Maikop, 1991), p. 92; Polovinkina, p.127. 
109 Ibid, p.128. 
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searching a way to return to his fatherland by reaching an agreement with the 
Russian authorities. In 1842, he informed his desire to the Russian mission in 
Istanbul stating that he would help Russian authorities in settling problems of North-
Western Caucasus. According to Felitsin, in 1844 Zanoko Sefer appealed to the 
Circassians via Hustan Hacı to abide by the conditions of the Treaty of Edirne and 
live with the Russians in peace.110 On the other hand, Russian authorities were not 
totally indifferent to Zanoko Sefer’s desire to return to Circassia. Rear-Admiral 
Serebriakov and General Aid-de-Camp A. I. Budberg were thinking of using Sefer 
Bey for the Russian plans in Circassia. Budberg proposed to send Sefer Bey to Kerch 
under the control of Russian authorities. He was to be allowed to contact with the 
Circassians and be granted a pension of thousand silver rubles for a year in return for 
his service.111 However, Sefer Bey did not want to live in Kerch as a Russian officer 
but wanted to return to Circassia. 
 
In a letter he wrote in 1845 to Circassia, Sefer Bey claimed that he was waiting 
for eighteen years for a change in the Russo-Ottoman relations. He stated that a war 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire would occur soon. However, meanwhile the 
Circassians should hold on, without concluding an agreement with the Russians, and 
abstain from atrocities, they must be prepared for the prospective Russo-Ottoman 
war. He also gave a vent to his desire to return to Circassia, but claimed that the 
Russian measures made such an initiative impossible. The keynote of his letter was 
his belief for a change in the international conjuncture, when the Circassian war 
                                                 
110 A. Kerashev, “Politicheskaia deiatelnost Kniaz Sefer-Beya Zanoko v gody Kavkazskoi voiny,” 
Rossiia i Cherkesiia: vtoraia polovina XVIII v. – XIX. v. (Maikop, 1995), p. 106. 
111 Kerashev, p. 106. 
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could be resulted.112 However, Sefer Bey continued his relations with Russia to come 
to an agreement for his return and for the end of the war.113  
 
The war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia that he waited for more than 
twenty years broke up in 1853, and a year later Britain and France joined the war on 
the side of the Ottoman Empire. Not surprisingly, Sefer Bey hoped to become the 
leader of the Circassians; however, Circassia changed a lot during the Russo-
Circassian war, and now he had an important rival: Muhammed Emin, the naib of 
Sheikh Shamil.  
 
Sheikh Shamil’s involvement in Circassia started in the first years of 1840s. He 
sent envoys to the Kabardians and the Western Circassians.114 The first envoy Hacı 
Muhammed was sent in 1842; however, he died soon in 1845. The second envoy was 
Süleyman Efendi sent in 1845, but he also could not succeed in uniting Circassia. 
Then, in April 1846, the Imam took things into his own hands and led a foray into 
Kabarda to urge them into revolt, but this campaign also failed. However, even after 
the failed Kabarda expedition, Shamil maintained his hope of a united North 
Caucasus. In 1848, he sent another envoy, Muhammed Emin to the Abzekhs. 
                                                 
112 “Report of General-lieutenant Zavadovski to General Neidhardt, 9[21] January 1845”, AKAK, Vol. 
IX. 
113 In the beginning of 1850s son of Sefer Bey Karabatır (In Ottoman documents there is no word of 
Karabatır, but only about İbrahim Bey who served for the Ottoman army. Most probably, İbrahim Bey 
and Karabatır was the same person) swore an oath for becoming a subject of the Russian Empire and 
obtained family estates around Anapa. This also affected Zanoko to write Serebriakov a letter in 
which he showed his acceptance of protectorship of Russian Empire, but rejecting to live in Kerch. He 
insisted on living in Circassia as an ambassador of Circassians. However, this proposal would be 
rejected by Russia. Serebriakov replied that Circassia is a part of the Russian Empire, therefore such a 
service for Sefer Bey is unacceptable, and Sefer Bey should accept the legitimate authority of the 
Russian Tsar. By this way negotiations between Zanoko Sefer and the Russian authorities ended, 
which led him to turn again Ottoman Empire and Britain. 
114 For the activities of Sheikh Shamil’s naibs see, A. D. Panesh, “Magomet-Amin na severo-
zapadnom Kavkaze 1848-1859 gg.,” Rossiia i Cherkesiia: vtoraia polovina XVIII. v. – XIX. v. 
(Maikop, 1995); A. D. Panesh, “Deiatelnost Hadji-Magometa i Suleimana-Efendia na severo-
zapadnom Kavkaze (1842-1846 gg.)”, Cherkesiia v XIX veke (Maikop, 1991); Polovinkina, pp. 130-
147.  
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At the end of January 1849, Muhammed Emin participated in the meeting of 
the Circassian elders and chieftains and declared his purpose to unite all Circassians. 
In his first attempts to broaden his order to the Western Caucasus with Hacı 
Muhammed and Süleyman Efendi, Sheikh Shamil encountered the well-established 
customs of Circassians as a barrier.115 However, simultaneously with the activities of 
the naibs of Sheikh Shamil in the Western Caucasus, an internal social war was 
augmenting among the Circassians.116 War conditions and the strengthening of 
muridizm movement with the egalitarian world-view of Islam fostered the process of 
declining the power of the aristocracy.117 The authority of noblemen was 
undermined, and political activity of the ordinary peasants rose significantly during 
the war years.118 According to Teophil Lapinski, a Polish officer fought in the side of 
the Circassians, Muhammed Emin succeeded in the spread of Islam to such a degree 
that the Ottomans could not achieve in fifty years, especially in promoting the 
ongoing war with Russia.119 Muhammed Emin initially tried to evade from any 
conflict with the Russian army, as he engaged in the establishment of the internal 
order and the organization of military forces. He created a military and governmental 
order in the land of Abzekhs similar to the Shamil’s state in Chechnya and 
Daghestan.120  
 
                                                 
115 A. D. Panesh, “Magomet-Amin na severo-zapadnom Kavkaze 1848-1859 gg.,” p. 115. 
116 A. H. Kasumov, H. A. Kasumov, “Osvoboditelnaia borba adigskih narodov v XIX veke,” p. 56; as 
a result of a rising in the lands of Natukhays and Shapsughs free peasants emancipated 8.500 houses 
(about 50.000 serfs). Istoriia norodov severnogo Kavkaza, p. 164. 
117 This situation of course led the noble class to seek the ways to protect their privileges. While they 
resorted to the help of Russia, Russian government also looked for their collaboration to complete the 
occupation of the Caucasus. The Ottoman Empire also would continue to resort its traditional policy 
of conducting relations through nobles.  
118 A. D. Panesh, “Magomet-Amin na severo-zapadnom Kavkaze 1848-1859 gg.,” pp. 120. 
119 Polovinkina, p. 140. 
120 A. D. Panesh, “Magomet-Amin na severo-zapadnom Kavkaze 1848-1859 gg.,” pp. 118-119. 
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Being a competent organizer, Muhammed Emin coordinated the Circassian 
resistance for ten years. Nevertheless, a united North Caucasus could not be realized 
even under the leadership of Muhammed Emin in Circassia. He, in late 1850, took 
the control of a significant part of Circassia.121 He was influential among free 
peasants as he preached the Islamic teachings, which promoted an egalitarian 
society.122 His effect would decrease the authority of Sefer Bey, and result in a 
dichotomy in the leadership of Circassia during and after the Crimean War. 
 
 
F. Searching the Circassian War in the Ottoman Documents before the 
Crimean War 
 
Considering this phase of the Russo-Circassian War, there are scarce 
documents in the Ottoman archives. What is more, in the chronicle of Ahmed Lütfi 
Efendi123, which narrated the period of 1825-1879, there is absolutely nothing about 
the ongoing war. This is one of the indications of the indifference of the Ottoman 
Empire to the Circassian war.  
 
When the documents are analyzed, there are a few topics that come to the fore: 
the trade124, the activities of the Circassian immigrants,125 the banishments of Sefer 
                                                 
121 Polovinkina, p. 134. 
122 Istoriia narodov severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.), pp. 169-170. 
123 He was the official historian of the Ottoman Empire during 1866-1907. 
124 “Boats en route Circassian and Abkhazian coasts for trade cannot enter the forbidden lands and 
cannot transfer the forbidden loads… On this matter, Trabzon, Bolu and Sinop governors will receive 
regulations that they should obey.” BOA C.DH, Dosya No.: 1034, 19 Zilhicce 1255 [23 February 
1840]. 
125 “Jajoglu Ali Bey, a member of the Circassian aristocracy, in contrary to the will of the Ottoman 
government, escaped to go Circassia through Sinop, therefore people who helped him should be 
investigated immediately.” “From the Grand Vizier to the Governor of Bolu, 5 Receb 1260 [21 June 
1844]”, BOA HR.MKT, Dosya No.: 5, Gömlek No.: 63. 
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Bey,126and the activities of Sheikh Shamil’s men in the Ottoman territory.127 
However, there is a common point for all these topics; the preservation of the 
friendly relations with the Russian Empire was the main aim of the Porte.128 After the 
1848-1849 revolutions, as a result of the rising tension between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire on the issue of the Polish and Hungarian refugees in the Ottoman 
lands, there seems to be a shift also in the Ottoman policy towards the Circassian 
matters.129  
 
 
G. Assessments 
 
One of Russia’s main aims in the war in Circassia until the Crimean War was 
the break up of the Circassian-Ottoman relations. However, all its efforts were in 
vain. Trade with the Ottoman Empire continued till the very end of the war. Russians 
also accepted the difficulty to break up the tight bonds between the Ottoman Empire 
                                                 
126 The best examples of the passive policy of the Ottoman Empire were those documents about Sefer 
Bey. He was exiled in Rumelia and lived there in exile approximately for sixteen years till the 
Crimean War. 
127 “As a result of the request the Consul of Russia in Trabzon, Vâli of Erzurum will try to prevent the 
activities of Hasan Hasbi, Sheikh Shamil’s murid, who is trying to collect men in the Ottoman 
territory.” “From the Grand Vizier to the Governor of Erzurum, 8 Zilkade 1261 [8 November 1845]”, 
BOA A.MKT.MHM, Dosya No.: 1, Gömlek No.: 86; A commission was established in Istanbul to try 
Hasan Hasbi who used fake firmans and decrees of the Grand Vizier (buyruldu), and seals to collect 
people for the war in the Caucasus. BOA A.AMD, Dosya No.: 1, Gömlek No.: 60, 24 Rebiulevvel 
1262 [22 March 1846]. 
128 Serasker Osman Pasha of Trabzon actually seems as pro-Russian. Maybe the geographical 
proximity of Trabzon to Russia forced him to act so much in favor of Russia, or maybe he had some 
kind of a special relationship with Russia: “… Osman Pasha of Trabzon always treats us with a most 
satisfactory disposition, and even active assistance to our consul, not only in the completion of the 
commands of the Porte, but frequently without waiting until the afore-mentioned orders.” “From 
Butenev to General Golovin, 7 [19] March 1839”, AKAK, Vol. IX, p. 459. Osman Pasha received a 
present from the Russian Tsar, for which he had to present an explanation. He claimed that this 
present was only about his careful control of the transit to the Circassia. BOA HR..MKT, Dosya No.: 1, 
Gömlek No.: 2, 4 Ramazan 1254 [21 November 1838]. 
129 After 1848 changing conditions also changed the policy of the Porte: This time local governors 
would not prevent a murid of Sheikh Shamil who came to find two miners, and what’s more he was to 
be given 7.500 kuruş. BOA A.AMD, Dosya No.: 19, Gömlek No.: 1, 23 Receb 1266 [4 June 1850]; 
Circassians who would return to their homeland were given 7500 kuruş. BOA A.MKT.MHM, Dosya 
No.: 18, Gömlek No.: 85, 7 Safer 1266 [23 December 1849]. 
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and the Circassians despite the collaboration of the Ottoman officials. Butenev 
claimed: 
 
However, together with this attitude of the Porte and its administrators in 
the Anatolian coast, it is necessary to admit that it is extremely difficult to 
stop the contacts between the inhabitants of Anatolia and the Circassians 
completely due to location of the territories as well as the usual habit in 
Turkey to have the slave trade with that area.130  
 
Kasumovs stressed the colonial policies of the Russian Empire in its failure to 
conduct peaceful relations with the Circassians.131 The reaction of the Circassians to 
the Russian policy of the isolation of Circassia from the international environment 
was an important dimension of the Circassian struggle. Russian efforts to suppress 
the Circassians helped the unification of Circassians, which lacked before the Treaty 
of Edirne. By this measure, the process of nationalism and the internal war between 
princely families and peasants went along with the war with Russia.  
 
For the Ottoman Empire, Circassia was considered a matter of importance, 
only when it had the potential to cause a problem with Russia. Throughout the period 
between the Treaty of Edirne and the Crimean War, no strategic calculation by the 
Ottomans can be visible. It proved itself; however, the trade with the Ottoman 
Empire was the backbone of the Circassian struggle. Besides, despite the Ottoman 
effort to preserve peace with Russia, the British and Polish activities regarding 
Circassia was mainly conducted through the Ottoman territories.  
 
In the Near East an unusual calm continued until the 1848 revolutions. Then, 
with the Crimean War of 1853 not only the international environment but also the 
                                                 
130  “From Butenev to General Golovin, 7 [19] March 1839”, AKAK, V. IX, p. 459. 
131 Genotsid Adygov, p. 87.  
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military, social and psychological circumstances of Circassia altered. It was actually 
the setting for which the Circassians waited for more than two decades. After the war 
this era would always be remembered as the ‘lost opportunity’. On the other hand, 
however, during the Crimean War the Ottoman Empire would pursue its more active 
policy regarding Circassia after the Treaty of Edirne, and try to carry out plans to 
strengthen the Caucasian barrier against Russia. 
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CHAPTER III 
OTTOMAN POLICY OF CIRCASSIA 
DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR 
 
During the initial stages of the war, the Caucasian front, traditionally one of the 
two fronts in the Russo-Ottoman wars, was a possible venue whence the Allied 
offensive against Russia would be conducted. When the Crimea was selected as the 
main theater of the war, the Caucasus became the second front, in which a possible 
Russian success might have brought a modest treaty although the Allies were the 
victors of the war.  
 
From 1854 until the end of the war, the Black Sea was under the complete 
control of the Allied Powers; Russia had great difficulties in transportation and 
reinforcement. However, the Russian forces managed to stand fast in the Caucasus 
and the Porte could neither provide the necessary aid to Sheikh Shamil, nor succeed 
in stimulating the Circassians to participate in the war actively. Zanoko Sefer, at that 
time an Ottoman Pasha, was the agent of the Porte in Circassia. Nevertheless, this 
important personality of the Circassian resistance was not only unsuccessful in 
uniting Circassia, but even worse; he reduced the influence of Muhammed Emin, by 
further dividing the Circassians. 
 
Throughout the Crimean War, the battles in the Caucasian front took place on 
and around the Russo-Ottoman border and never spread to the North Caucasus, since 
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the Porte could not succeed in utilizing the mountaineers against Russia. During the 
Crimean War, which was actually the opportunity for what the Circassians had 
waited impatiently for more than two decades, interestingly Circassia remained by 
and large silent. This war was also a chance for the Ottoman Empire either to reverse 
its former territorial losses or to establish buffer zones for more secure borders. 
That’s why, apparently, the Ottoman Empire as well as the Circassians could not 
make use of the opportunities efficiently. However, besides these lack of success of 
the Ottoman Empire and the Circassians, the actual limits of the military capabilities 
of the Porte and the mountaineers of the Caucasus, as well as the war aims of Britain 
and France should also be considered.  
 
 
A. War Diplomacy and the Aims of the Belligerents  
 
No doubt, the rivalry over the Ottoman Empire, namely the Eastern  Question, 
was the main reason for the war.132 The diplomatic crisis, which ultimately led to the 
war, erupted in 1850. The war broke in the form of a Russo-Ottoman war in 1853, 
and only in late March 1854 it developed into a European war. The relative 
tranquility in the European state of affairs after the Straits Convention of 1841 was 
followed by a series of crises in the late 1840s and early 1850s: the revolutions of 
1848-1849 the Russian attempt to find a common ground with Britain for the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire, and the Russo-French conflict over the Holy Places 
in Palestine. The diplomacy before and throughout the war demonstrates that the 
                                                 
132 For a detailed analyses of the diplomacy of the war, see, Temperley, pp. 251-384 and Cezmi 
Karasu, “Kırım Savaşı Sırasında Osmanlı Diplomasisi (1853-1856)”, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, 
Ankara University (Ankara, 1998); Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance 
(Virginia, 1977), pp. 51-77; Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War: A Cautionary Tale (New York, 
1991). 
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great powers did not want a war, but the crisis could not be managed: actually the 
Great Power’s determination not to lose the pride and prestige, as well as the 
influence over the Porte led to a European war instead of peace.  
 
Explaining the causes of the war only with the policies of the great powers 
would be redundant. In fact, this war did not start as a European war, but as a Russo-
Turkish one. The Menshikov Mission and the ‘Vienna Note’133 aroused the religious 
and national feelings in Turkey and became one of the motives of the declaration of 
war by the Porte on Russia.134 Most importantly; however, the confidence in the 
western support led the Porte to adopt such a bold policy against Russia.135 
 
After the suppression of the 1848-1849 revolutions in Europe with the Russian 
moral and military support, Russia had all reasons to feel itself more powerful. Yet, 
Nicholas I was in the opinion that only with a concerted action with Britain, Russia 
could attain its objectives in the Near East. During the first months of 1853, the Tsar 
repeatedly explained his opinions and plans about the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire to Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg.136 Seymour 
reported to John Russell, the British Foreign Minister: “The mind of the Tsar is now 
clearer. What he wants is the partition of Turkey by excluding France.”137 However, 
                                                 
133 In July 1853, diplomatic activities continued under the chairmanship of Austria in Vienna. 
However, the text of the Vienna Note, which was based on the French proposal, was declined by the 
Porte as it was perceived to increase the power of Russia over the Greek Orthodox subject of the 
Ottoman Empire. Ottoman refusal of the Vienna note brought the Russo-Ottoman war. The weakest 
point of this diplomatic effort in Vienna was that the Turkish side was supposed to accept whatever 
the European powers wanted. For comprehensive discussions of the Vienna Note see, Rich, pp. 66-88 
and Saab, pp. 51-77. 
134 There was a succession of demonstrations in Istanbul for a Holy War in late August and early 
September. Rich, p. 82. 
135 W. E. D. Allen – Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-
Caucasian Border 1828-1921 (Cambridge, 1953), p. 58.  
136 Akdes Nimet Kurat, Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917’ye Kadar (Ankara, 1999), pp. 326-329.  
137 Hayrettin Bey, Kırım Harbi, prepared by Şemsettin Kutlu (İstanbul, no date), p. 176. 
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the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was one of the established aims of the British 
foreign policy to protect Britian’s interests in the Near East, as well as to provide the 
security of the route to India. Therefore, the Russian initiative could not find a 
positive response from Britain; on the contrary it made a Britain-France alliance 
possible against the Russian desires.  
 
The apparent reason of the war was not the partition of the Ottoman territories, 
but another phase of the Eastern Question, seemingly a more trivial matter between 
France and Russia: The dispute over the holy places of the Palestine. While it was a 
minor issue at first, the overstress of Russia and France transformed it into an 
international crisis. The acceptance of the French wishes over the Holy Places by the 
Porte seemed to injure the Russian pride. It was actually a defeat of the “Gendarme 
of Europe”138 against Napoleon III, who came to throne in opposition to the very 
basis of the Vienna system.  
 
Ostensibly connected with the problem of the trusteeship of the Holy Places, in 
May 1853, Prince Alexander Menshikov, the special envoy of Nicholas to Istanbul, 
declared an ultimatum about the recognition of the Russian protectorate over all the 
Orthodox subjects of the Porte. However, the actual demand of Russia was the 
conclusion of a secret treaty along the lines with the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi, which 
would guarantee the Russian influence over the Porte. Menshikov and his activities 
in Istanbul kept the European diplomacy busy for a few months. While Britain and 
France pursued a conciliatory policy during the crisis, completely undiplomatic 
behaviors of Menshikov harmed the Turkish pride and strengthened the pro-war 
                                                 
138 A pseudonym for Nicholas I, which refers his devotion to protect the current order in Europe with 
his energetic involvement to any revolutionary movement.  
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circles. Starting from Menshikov’s ultimatom to the last efforts for the Ottoman 
recognition of the Vienna Note, the diplomacy never ceased to function. However, 
after the rejection of this note the war became unavoidable. 
 
Actually, when diplomacy was ongoing, the initial preparations for a war were 
also under way. During the summer of 1853 when the Vienna Note was under 
discussion, in June the fleets of Britain and France sailed towards the Dardanelles, 
and on 2 July the Russian troops crossed the river Pruth and invaded the 
Principalities. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire tried to strengthen its armies 
in both the Caucasian and Balkan fronts throughout the summer.  
 
As a result of the failure of the diplomatic efforts, and not having the 
evacuation of the Principalities, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia on 4 
October 1853, and in the same month the hostilities started near the river Danube. 
The so-called “Sinop massacre”139 on 30 November 1853 accelerated the decisions 
of Britain and France to join the war and in the late of March 1854 the war became a 
European one. 
 
The Crimean War was actually designed as a limited war aiming only to 
enforce Russia not to engage in any activity at the expense of the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the war played in a peripheral theatre, in the Crimea, 
and throughout the war diplomatic activities of the belligerents to find a common 
ground did not cease. There were also some grandiose plans under discussion, as an 
independent Poland and a Caucasus, however such great ideas or plans could not turn 
                                                 
139 The Russian Admiral Nakhimov destroyed the Turkish fleet in Sinop harbor, and this battle was 
named as “Sinop massacre” in the British media as a sign of the anger of the British public. 
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into a war aim of the alliance.140 In addition, as the cost of the war increased and the 
war tragedies reflected to the British and the French masses thanks to the new 
technological innovations in photography, the Crimean war would lose its public 
support, and any grandiose project, which would prolong the war, could not be 
employed.  
 
In addition, the war aims of the allied powers could hardly be regarded as 
identical. While Britain was the most enthusiastic to give a hard blow to Russia, 
Napoleon III was just in search of an easy victory, which would strengthen his 
position and prestige in France, as well as in Europe.141 On the other hand, the Porte 
aimed to guarantee its security as much as possible as a result of this war since it 
enjoyed the support of the Great Powers. 
 
Having provided the security of the Balkans and Istanbul thanks to the policies 
of Britain, France and Austria,142 the Ottoman Empire aimed to engage in a 
successful war in the Caucasus front. The Porte not only strengthened the Batum and 
the Anatolian armies, but also developed policies to encourage the mountaineers to 
participate in the war. Russian troops in the Caucasus were dispersed over a vast 
territory and their duties and problems were numerous. Therefore, fighting “took the 
                                                 
140 In Britain, during the Crimean War there was a great enjoyment for the people of the Caucasus and 
hatred for the Russians similar to the Russophobia of 1830s. British public opinion was so favor of the 
freedom of Circassia that Russia was perceived as “the barbarian of the north”, and there was an idea 
of creating an Asian Switzerland from Circassia. Captain Spencer, pp. 298, 394. 
In 1854, several articles about the Circassian independence, many of which were written by Urquhart, 
appeared in the British press. Luxenburg, p. 245. 
141 Malcolm-Smith claims that “Napoleon III saw in the war nothing but a means to secure his throne 
and dynasty by reviving military glories of the First Empire, and he cared nothing at all for the 
principles at stake. Malcolm-Smith, p. 293. 
142 While Austria was not a participant of the Crimean war, the Austrian policy provided the Ottoman 
Empire a secure Balkan front after its initial successes. Actually, the Austria not only refused the 
partition plan of Russia over the Ottoman Balkan territories in 1853, but furthermore, the Austrian 
ultimatum in June 1854 provided the Russia’s evacuation of the Principalities in August. Rich, pp. 
118-123. 
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form of a Turkish offensive and of a relatively passive defence of the frontier by the 
Russians”.143 However, as Allen and Muratoff claimed, “the Turkish army remained 
incapable of efficient manoeuvre and therefore unsuitable to carry out any offensive 
operation”.144 Actually, the unsuccessful offensive against Ahıska and the defeat in 
Başgedikler, and the destruction of an Ottoman fleet in Sinop in the fall of 1853 were 
the first signs of the ineffective and unsuccessful Ottoman role in the Caucasus 
throughout the war.  
 
 
B. First initiatives of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus front: 1853 
 
When the Batum and the Anatolian armies were under preparation, in August 
1853, Sheikh Shamil raided into Kakheti with 10.000 murids, most probably in order 
to show his desire to collaborate.145 On the other hand, the Porte also wanted to make 
use of Sheikh Shamil and his naib Muhammed Emin. On 9 October 1853, a firman, 
calling for the ‘Holy War’, was sent to Sheikh Shamil. The firman, asked Sheikh 
Shamil to assault on the Russian positions. Sheikh Shamil replied with his letter to 
Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha (known as Abdi Pasha), the Commander-in Chief of the 
Anatolian army, in December 1853. In his letter, Sheikh Shamil claimed that with a 
joint action Russians could be forced out of the Caucasus. However, this letter was 
directed to Istanbul only in May 1854.146 In December 1853, Sheikh Shamil held a 
gathering of all his naibs in New Dargiyya, after which all the Chechens were 
                                                 
143 Allen - Muratoff, p. 59. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Gammer, pp. 267-268. 
146 Mustafa Budak, “1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı’nda Kafkas Cephesi”, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 
İstanbul University (İstanbul, 1993), pp. 21-27.  
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instructed to be ready for a campaign.147 In the fall 1853, Muhammed Emin was also 
engaged in successful operations against the Russian fortifications in Circassia.148 
 
In order to be affective in the Caucasus, the Porte also planned to use the 
influence of the Ottoman subjects of the Caucasian origin. In October 1853, Zanoko 
Sefer Bey had been recalled from his exile in Edirne to Istanbul,149 and in November 
together with Behçet Bey, another Circassian, got the title of Mir-i miran.150 On 15 
October 1853, Hacı Mehmed Efendi, Sefer Pasha’s man, was sent to Circassia. 
Besides, the Dagestani Beys in Istanbul, being charged to organize the Dagestanis, 
were sent to Dagestan via Erzurum and Batum.151  
 
However, the prerequisite of any possible Ottoman engagement on the 
Northern Caucasus was the accomplishment of the military supremacy of the 
Ottoman armies in the Russo-Ottoman border and the Southern Caucasus. The 
Ottoman victory at St. Nicholas on 26 October 1853 was actually a good start for the 
Ottoman army, however, a series of defeats followed. Russia guaranteed the security 
of the Southern Caucasus against the Ottoman offensive in 1853, as a result of its 
successes in Gümrü (15 November), Ahıska (26 November), and most importantly in 
Başgedikler (1 December). Moreover, the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Sinop 
on 30 November 1853 would prevent further Ottoman involvements in the Caucasus 
till the active participation of Britain and France in the war.152 
                                                 
147 Gammer, p. 270. 
148 Budak, p. 44. 
149 BOA İ.DH, Dosya No.: 282, Gömlek No.: 17709, 7 Muharrem 1270 [10 October 1853]. 
150 BOA A.DVN, Dosya No.: 94, Gömlek No.: 2, 25 Safer 1270 [27 November 1853]. 
151 Budak, p. 44. 
152 Allen - Muratoff, pp. 61-65. 
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In this first phase of the war it became clear that the Ottoman Empire would 
pursue a Caucasian policy on the base of the utilization of the mountaineers for the 
Ottoman success in the Russo-Ottoman border, instead of a real involvement in the 
Northern Caucasus. 
 
 
C. The Ottoman plans regarding the Caucasus after the declaration of war 
on Russia by Britain and France: 1854 
 
When Britain and France declared war in late March 1854, they hardly had any 
plan other than giving a lesson to Russia. At first, neither the war arena, nor the war 
aims were clear. The first attempts concentrated in the Balkans against the Russian 
presence in the Principalities. However, after the withdrawal of the Russian forces 
from the Balkans, the Crimea and the Caucasus came under discussion as to where 
the Allied offensive would be conducted.153 When the plans of the allied powers 
clarified, and the Crimea was assigned as the war ground, then the importance of the 
Caucasus decreased. This did not mean, however, that the Caucasian front was 
overall abandoned. Throughout the war, plans for an effective utilization of the 
mountaineers were still under discussion; however, there was hardly any 
coordination among the allies regarding how to use the mountaineers.  
 
The allied navy powers entered the Black Sea to protect the Turkish coasts 
against the possible Russian onslaught on 5 January 1854. Afterwards, Russia took a 
                                                 
153 Genotsid Adygov, p. 110. While the war named ‘the Crimean War’ referring the most significant 
campaign of the war over Sevastopol, the war also waged in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and as well as 
in the Baltik, Pacific and the White Sea. For the discussion of the battles in these fronts, see, 
Baumgart, pp. 167-176, 185-192. 
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defensive stance, and not only brought back its navy to Sevastopol, but also 
abandoned forts and garrisons on the eastern Black Sea coast with the exception of 
Anapa, Novorossiysk, Gelincik and Sohumkale.154 Actually, the Caucasian command 
of Russia was very pessimistic for the future Russian presence in the Caucasus. 
Prince Mikhail Vorontsov, the viceroy of the Caucasus, left the scene, thinking there 
was no possibility for Russia’s success. General Read, who was appointed in his 
stead, was more pessimistic. He advocated the evacuation of all the Muslim 
territories in the eastern Caucasus, and even the temporary sacrifice of Georgia, 
Imeretia, Mingrelia and Guria. He proposed a Russian defense along the rivers 
Kuban, Sunja, and Sulak. While these fears were to some extent exaggerated, the 
opportunity of the Ottoman army in the Caucasian front was obvious as also Allen 
and Muratoff put down: 
 
The possibility of widespread attacks by the Cherkesses – with Allied 
support from the sea – and the likelihood of an invasion of Kakheti by 
Shamyl were real dangers, and there was no absolute certainty that the 
‘peaceful’ Muslim population of eastern Transcaucasia would remain loyal 
if they were disturbed by the news of Allied and Turkish successes or 
Persian intervention.155 
 
In the presence of the Allied navy in the Black Sea, Ottoman navy could be 
used to help the mountaineers of the Caucasus to strengthen the front in the 
Caucasus. For this aim, Adulphus Slade, a British who served in the Ottoman navy 
with the name “Müşavir Pasha”, gave a note to the Kaptan Pasha, in which he argued 
that if Sohumkale had been captured, then the Ottoman navy could have moved 
along the Abkhazian coasts to Anapa to conquer all the military positions of Russia 
along the Black Sea coast, and moreover to handle military aid, including even 
                                                 
154 Istoriia narodov severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. – 1917 g.), p. 186. Gelincik and Sohumkale 
also would be evacuated soon in consideration of the difficulty to defend. 
155 Allen - Muratoff, p. 66. 
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cannons, to the Circassians.156 According to Slade, the composition of the Caucasian 
mountaineers, Turkish navy and the Anatolian army could succeed against Russia in 
the Caucasus front.157  
 
This note was accepted by the Porte, and Kaptan Pasha appointed Müşavir 
Pasha to discuss such a Turkish initiative to Circassia with the admirals of the allied 
forces. However, Britain and France were not so much enthusiastic for such an 
Ottoman mission. Even though this proposal was not totally rejected, Allied generals 
expressed that it would be better for the Ottoman fleet to wait till a British-French 
fleet completed an operation in the Caucasus. France and British admiralty was only 
in favor of an initiative in which two Ottoman ferries would move to Circassia with a 
mission to propagate the war against Russia, instead of an actual operation. It seems, 
however, that the Ottoman side believed that the British and French admirals could 
be persuaded. Kaptan Pasha ordered to prepare a fleet, which would  transport 
armaments and ammunitions, as well as a few hundred Circassians including Sefer 
Pasha, Behçet Pasha, Sadettin Pasha (Vâli of Aydın), Sırrı Pasha (Vâli of Yemen), 
Ferhad Pasha, and Ramiz Bey.158  
 
This mission aimed to invite the local population to join the war by using 
firmans and nişans. Sefer Pasha had a firman, which empowered him as a civilian 
and military governor of all the Circassian lands. According to the decision taken in 
the Meclis-i Muvakkat-ı Harbiye (Provisional Assembly of War) first the 
                                                 
156 In this note, Slade gave an outline of the conquest of the Circassian coasts from Russia. He argues 
that it is possible to get the support of the Circassians and Crimean Tatars by showing the greatness 
and the power of the Ottoman Empire. For this note, see S. Adulphus Slade, Türkiye ve Kırım Harbi, 
translated by Ali Rıza Seyfi (İstanbul, 1943), pp. 260-261. 
157 Ibid, p. 126.  
158 Vak’a-nüvis Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi Tarihi, Vol. IX, prepared by M. Münir Aktepe (Istanbul, 1984), 
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communication with Muhammed Emin should be established and his help to Sefer 
and Behçet Pashas should be guaranteed. The Ottoman Empire would try to use the 
popularity of Sefer Pasha to rally the Circassians. He was also assigned to encourage 
Prince Mikhail Shirvashidze, the most influential man in Abkhazia, to take a part on 
the side of the allied powers.159  
 
This operation would not only be useful for Circassia, but also for the 
Anatolian army, since an important amount of munitions and weapons would be 
handled to Sohumkale.160 Most importantly, such a fleet would raise the Ottoman 
prestige in Circassia, and would provide their active participation in the war, which 
could not be accomplished so far. It was hoped that with the support of the Allied 
forces, logistic help to the Caucasus would be easier, and by this way cooperation 
between Sheikh Shamil and Circassians would be attained and a blow to Russia in 
the Caucasus would be possible.  
 
Obviously, the Porte gave a special importance to this mission. Having these 
aims in mind, the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet left Istanbul on 6 May 1854 - after a day 
that the allied fleet under the command of Lyons started its campaign on the 
Circassian shores- to the Balçık Bay to consult the Ottoman operation to the 
Caucasus. However, according to the Ottoman plans, Ahmed Pasha, the admiral of 
the Ottoman fleet, would meet with the generals of Britain and France, and only after 
their approval the Ottoman mission to the Circassian shores would be initiated. 
However, Dundas, the Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces, opposed to the 
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Ottoman plans stating that such an operation should be activated only after the return 
of the allied fleet.  
 
After the arrival of a battleship at Balçık, which brought news about the 
campaign of Captain Lyons and that the Circassians shores were evacuated by the 
Russians, then only three battleships were assigned for the Ottoman mission. All the 
Circassians, who were waiting for weeks in Kavarna Bay (near Balçık), in a 
disorganized way and in a hurry, were transported from the twelve battleships to only 
three, and were sent to Circassia in miserable conditions on 24 May. During this 
process an outraged Pasha cried in grief, “I will never forget what was done to us”.161 
Of course, having landed in Sohumkale in such conditions, the mission most 
probably could not have a positive impact on the mountaineers for the image of the 
Ottoman Empire, which was actually one of the main aims of the mission. Slade 
complained: 
 
For half-civilized peoples, there is a great difference between landing of 
officials, envoys, helping battalions, armaments and ammunitions by a big 
and pompous navy, and a swift leaving of them to the sea sands by a few 
stuffed transporting ships. Transportation to such a place [Circassia] an 
expeditionary team and force is not the same with carrying passengers and 
trade materials. Rather than to act in this way, according to the orders of the 
Admirals, it would be better to send everything back to Istanbul.162  
 
As a matter of fact, this mission was a complete disappointment. It not only 
failed to achieve anything, but also negatively affected any possible joint attempt of 
the Allied powers in the course of the war. Sefer Pasha would not collaborate with 
the Allied powers in the following year. This operation was also one of the instances 
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that France and Britain did not see the Ottomans a real ally. Ottoman soldiers (and 
officers for that matter) were perceived by them as inferiors throughout the war. 
 
The Porte continued its activities in Circassia in summer 1854. On 3 July 1854, 
Mustafa Pasha was appointed to Sohumkale. On 8 July an Ottoman fleet under the 
command of Ahmed Pasha, composed of 5 ships, arrived at Sohumkale with 160 
boxes of cartridge, 30 barrels of gunpowder, and some amount of lead. Replies to the 
letters of Muhammed Emin were also sent with this fleet. Then, Muhammed Emin 
would arrive to Varna with one of the ships of this fleet (Feyz-i Bari) to search a 
common ground with the Allied commanders.163  
 
In July 1854, when the war theater was not yet clear, Muhammed Emin as the 
leader of a Circassian delegation composed of 70 Circassian chieftains and elders 
came to Varna to discuss a joint activity. Allied powers gave special importance to 
the Circassian delegation.164 Actually, before his arrival Muhammed Emin succeeded 
in giving a hard blow to the Russian forces in Daryal Pass on 26 May 1854.165 
However, the mountaineers of the Caucasus were not perceived as a real ally, 
moreover the situation of the Turkish army in the Russo-Ottoman border was not 
promising.166  
 
Nonetheless, Russia’s army of 270.000 soldiers, with 70.000 in the Russo-
Ottoman border, was probably the most important reason for the abandonment of the 
Caucasus option. Russia did not withdraw its forces from the Caucasus, which was 
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indeed constituted a considerable figure, and a successful attack against those forces 
did not seem to be an easy deal. If the Russian forces in the Caucasus would move to 
the Crimean peninsula, then a victory in the Crimea would be more difficult. The 
possible future of the Caucasus in case of an allied victory was still in abeyance. 
After the conquest of the Caucasus, there might be needed a military protection of 
the Allied powers, which they could not afford.167 
 
Muhammed Emin with the Circassian delegation passed to Istanbul to discuss 
the future steps with the Porte and the Padishah on 27 July 1854. In his residence in 
Istanbul, he was very well received, and materially assisted. However, again any 
clear plan for a joint action was not visible. After two months in Istanbul, 
Muhammed Emin left Istanbul for Batum with Ferik Mustafa Pasha, now the 
commander of the Batum army, the Circassian chieftains, and the Tunisian soldiers 
on 1 October 1854. According to Budak, after the appointment of Mustafa Pasha, the 
loyalty of the people of Sohumkale to the Ottoman Empire increased. Mustafa Pasha 
was given the power to distribute ranks and salaries.168 This was actually a 
manifestation of the classical Ottoman policy in the Caucasus, which was based on 
the distribution of ranks and salaries rather than any concrete plan and action. 
 
In short, all these efforts proved fruitless. There was not any concrete attempt 
of the Circassians and the Allied Powers against Russia in 1854 in the northern 
Caucasus. For the Ottoman Empire, 1854 was also an unsuccessful year in the 
southern Caucasus. Ottoman armies were ineffective nearly in all their engagements 
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with Russia throughout the summer.169 Shamil’s campaign of July 1854 to invade 
Kakheti also remained ill-fated. Furthermore, this was Sheikh Shamil’s last serious 
effort, after which he took a cautious attitude and waited for the successes of the 
Turkish army in the Russo-Ottoman border.170 
 
 
D. The Caucasian front in 1855 
 
In 1855, as a result of the prolonged Sevastopol campaign, Britain seemed to 
be more enthusiastic to take measures in order to encourage the Circassians to join 
the war. In late 1854, Longworth was sent to Circassia by the Foreign Office in order 
to assess the capabilities of the Caucasians. He arrived at Circassia in 1855 in a 
steamer loaded with arms and gifts for the Circassians.171 France also sent its agent 
Manduit (or Champoisser) to Circassia. According to the official explanations, they 
would only try to encourage Circassians to participate in the war against Russia, and 
would not have any politic mission.172 Longworth was especially warned not to give 
any promise to the Circassians on behalf of the British government.173 
 
According to Longworth, the power of the nobles in Circassia diminished 
significantly mainly as a result of the activities of Muhammed Emin. He stated in one 
of his letter that the landed forces of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus raised the 
prestige of Turks. On the other hand, he complained that all his efforts were averted 
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by Turks and Sefer Pasha.174 According to Longworth, Turks became uneasy about 
his activities, and tried to ruin all his plans. In his report, he claimed that Sefer Pasha 
prevented his advance to the inner spheres of Circassia. He also pronounced a 
complain of Muhammed Emin in which Sheikh Shamil’s naib argued that the Porte 
did not want him to get in contact with the British officials. When Muhammed Emin 
visited the British Embassy in Istanbul, and when he got in contact with Brock and 
Hughs, two British agents in Circassia, his salary was terminated by the Ottoman 
government.175  
 
Such a less than friendly attitude of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasian 
matters towards its allies during the Crimean War was quite controversial. At least a 
firman was written according to the instructions of Stratford Canning de Redcliffe, 
and was sent to Mustafa Pasha, commander of Batum army, via Longworth. 
According to this firman, Mustafa Pasha would completely collaborate (muavenet-i 
kâmile ile) with the British and French agents.176 However, Longworth’s 
explanations, at least, showed that there was hardly any identical and coherent 
Caucasian policy of the Allied Powers, and what’s more, there seemed to be some 
kind of an implicit rivalry among them in the Caucasus. On the other hand, the Porte 
also sent its agent Enis Efendi, a Daghestani, to Circassia. According to the Porte, it 
was necessary to send such an agent to Circassia as the other two allies sent theirs 
(belki müttefikeynin memurları yanında Devlet-i Aliyye’nin dahi böyle bir memuru 
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bulunması kavâid-i müstelzem olacağından). Actually, the Porte was searching the 
possibility to take Circassia under its influence after the war. Mission of Enis Bey 
was, most probably, to investigate the possibility of this, and to try once more to 
encourage the mountaineers to collaborate with the Ottoman officials.177  
 
On the other hand, Mustafa Pasha wanted Sefer Pasha to establish a home 
guard composed of the Circassians, which was to be included to the Batum corps. He 
also sent Hacı İsmail to persuade the Circassians to support the Ottoman forces. 
However, Hacı İsmail’s effort, as well as appeal of Sefer Pasha to form a home guard 
from the Circassians was not welcome on the part of the Circassians.178  
 
Mustafa Pasha arrived at Gelincik on 18 May, 1855, accompanied by also 
Sefer Pasha. He intended to arrange a combined operation with Circassians against 
the Russian forts in the Circassian coasts.179 At the same time, in order to relieve 
their forces siege the Sevastopol, the Allied navy also started an operation in the 
Azov Sea and the connected territories. The allied forces occupied Kerch on 25 
May.180 After the Allied control in Azov Sea, Russia evacuated Soğucak Bay and 
concentrated its forces in Anapa fortress.181 On June 1855, the Allied forces this time 
investigated that Anapa fortress was also evacuated after the powder-magazines were 
exploded and barracks were burnt.182 Thereafter, on 10 June 1855, Sefer Pasha 
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settled in Anapa fortress with considerable numbers of Circassian fighters.183 During 
the summer of 1855, Mustafa Pasha and Sefer Pasha continued their activities in 
Anapa.184  
 
From then on, Sefer Pasha’s influence among compatriots increased. However, 
it was the very last phase of the war, and Sevastopol and Kars campaigns would say 
the last words for both sides. While on the one hand, Allies won the war with the 
successful Sevastopol campaign, Russia’s success in capturing Kars, would resulted 
in its avoiding any heavy losses in the Treaty of Paris. It was actually the sign of the 
final failure of the Ottoman army in the Caucasus front. 
 
In fact, the discord among the Allies prepared a way for the success of Russia’s 
Kars campaign. Ömer Pasha, who understood the urgency of the situation in Kars 
best, insisted on the departure of the Ottoman troops from the Crimea. However, the 
refusal of France for any departure of troops during the Sevastopol campaign 
prevented any timely support to Kars. Only when Sevastopol fell in September 1855, 
then Ömer Pasha could depart for the Caucasian front. It was so late that Kars 
surrendered on November 23, which resulted in a more powerful Russia on the table 
in Paris.  
 
If Ömer Pasha’s plan had been put into practice on time, then probably an 
allied offensive in Georgia with the participation of Sheikh Shamil’s forces would 
                                                                                                                                          
by the Russians see, “Rear-Admiral Stewart to Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons”, Russian War, pp. 
186-187. 
183 Ibid.  
184 According to the Russian sources Britain tried to establish a cavalry force composed of 6.000 
Circassians, which would be transferred to the Crimea. Istoriia narodov severnogo Kavkaza (konets 
XVIII v. – 1917 g.), p. 191. 
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also have been possible. During his campaign in Georgia, Ömer Pasha tried to 
establish a cavalry force composed of the Circassians. Therefore, he chose his base in 
Sohumkale rather than Redutkale.185 Being convinced that Sefer Pasha could not 
attract the Circassians to the side of the Allied Powers, Ömer Pasha would try to 
establish contacts with Muhammed Emin in September 1855.186 However, 
Muhammed Emin also could not be successful in establishing a cavalry force from 
the Circassians to be used in the Ottoman army. According to Slade the selection of 
Sohumkale was the one of the important reasons for the failure of the campaign as it 
was very distant to Tiflis, in comparison to Redutkale.187 
 
 
F. The Polish Role and the Cossack Regiments 
 
The Crimean war was the time for what the Polish nationalists were waiting for 
decades. Therefore, as can be expected, the Polish immigrants tried to be active in 
order to realize the idea of an independent Poland throughout the Crimean War. Not 
only many Polish officers served in the Ottoman army, but also a Polish regiment 
was established with the financial support of Britain.188  
 
Sadık Pasha (Michal Czaykowski) organized a regiment of “the Ottoman 
Cossacks”.189 The regiment would be composed of the Cossacks of Dobruca, 
deserters from the Russian army, fugitive Ukrainian serfs, and volunteers from the 
                                                 
185 Allen-Muratoff, pp. 95-96. 
186 To be used in the war in the southern Caucasus, Muhammed Emin claimed that he could establish 
an army of 20.000 cavalry and 40.000 voluntary forces. Genotsid Adygov, pp. 115-116.  
187 Slade, pp. 255-256. 
188 Skochen, p. 58. 
189 According to Skochen, these cavalry detachments were called “Sultan Kazakları- Sultan’s 
Cossacks”. Ibid. 
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Balkan Slavs, and commanded by the Polish officers. Sadık Pasha tried to encourage 
the Porte for a military cooperation with the Polish refugees. As a result, Zamoyski, 
Chrzanowski, Bystrzonowski, and Charles Rozyski were invited to serve as generals 
in the Turkish army.190  
 
A regiment of 1400 soldiers was formed under the command of the Polish 
veterans. This regiment played a role in relieving the fortress of Silistre, which was 
besieged by the Russians. After the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian 
forces, Sadık Pasha also acted as a military governor of Bucharest.191 
 
In the army of Ömer Pasha during the expedition to Georgia, the only cavalry 
was the Ottoman Cossacks, recruited from among the Polish refugees and the 
descendants of Cossack fugitives who had settled at the mouth of the Danube.192 
Besides, the Ottoman agents, sent to Circassia, also included Polish and Hungarian 
immigrants. On the other hand, Czartoryski was invested with the power to select 
and dispatch Polish officers to the East and was semi-officially recognized as the 
head of the Polish emigration and treated as the Sultan’s ally.193  
 
After the war, the Polish troops were disbanded by the British government’s 
orders and left to the good will of the Turks; some of them remained in the Turkish 
army – one regiment of the Ottoman Cossacks, and another of Ottoman Dragoons, a 
handful went to the Caucasus to join the Circassian insurgents, and some returned to 
                                                 
190 Kukiel, p. 281. 
191 Rudnytsky, p. 181. 
192 Allen-Muratoff, pp. 86, 95. 
193 Kukiel, p. 281. 
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France and Britain.194 Actually, the Crimean war did not give the opportunity to the 
Polish nationalists to liberate their homeland from the Russian domination. The idea 
of independent Poland was also abandoned like the idea of an independent Circassia, 
and the Polish cause was left to its own destiny. 
 
 
G. Slave Trade during the War 
 
The Crimean War period was also significant from another aspect for the 
Ottoman-Circassian relations, since at that time the slave trade was for the first time 
prohibited.195 
During the Crimean War, the slave trade rose up significantly as captives 
increased, and the Russian quarantine was abandoned. In the meantime, Britain 
attempted to prevent the slave trade in Circassia. Stratford de Redcliffe provided a 
firman, which was sent to Mustafa Pasha in Sohumkale to prevent the slave trade.196 
Upon the British desires, the Ottoman Empire attempted to terminate the Circassian 
and the Georgian slave trade.197 However, during the war it was impossible to cease 
the slave trade. Besides, such an initiative should result in a deterioration of relations 
with the Allied Powers and the mountaineers. The correspondent of Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine very well portrayed the significance of the slave trade in 
Circassia:  
                                                 
194 Ibid, p. 304; For the Zamoyski’s wish to return to Paris, see BOA İ.HR, Dosya No.: 7478, 5 
Ramazan 1272 [10 May 1856]. 
195 Zafer Gölen, “İkinci Meşrutiyet’in İlanından Sonra Çerkez Teavün Cemiyeti’nin Çalışmaları: 
Çerkez Köleliğini Önlemeye Yönelik Faaliyetler”, Toplumsal Tarih, Vol. 10, No.: 57 (September 
1998), pp. 53. 
196 Luxenburg, p. 244, footnote 261. 
197 BOA İ.HR, Dosya No.: 5601, 7 Safer 1271 [30 October 1854]; For the instruction given to the 
Baştercüman, 10 Safer 1271 [2 November 1854] and the instruction given to Mustafa Pasha, the 
Commander of the Batum army, for the punishment of the Circassians who were dealing with the 
slave trade, see, BOA HR.SYS, Dosya No.: 1190, Gömlek No.: 12. 
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It is a question, however, whether a traffic which is so highly remunerative 
to those engaged in it can be permanently destroyed. The immediate effect 
has been to create the greatest dissatisfaction among the Circassians 
themselves…. It is questionable, therefore, whether it would not have been 
wiser to have waited until the termination of the war, before doing anything 
to disgust allies whose goodwill it is so important to secure. No doubt the 
Circassian slave trade is utterly indefensible in a moral point of view, but it 
does not appeal to our feelings of humanity as does that of the traffic in 
negroes upon the coast of Africa. It is a proceeding which is eminently 
satisfactory to all parties; whereas now the young ladies are disappointed, 
the Turks are disconsolate, the merchants are ruined, and the papas are 
disgusted. ‘Alas!’ said a tattered old serf, ‘there is no longer now the 
possibility of my granddaughter becoming the mother of a sultan’.198 
 
Actually, the Ottoman Empire unwillingly accepted the British and French 
desires about the slave trade in order not to deteriorate its relations with its allies 
during the war as Toledano points out: 
 
 …as for the Ottoman side, this policy was adopted only in order to relieve 
European pressure at a sensitive time when the Empire depended on the 
military and political support of Britain and France… The sacrifice seemed 
minimal at that point and was viewed as part of the war effort, to be 
rescinded when peace returned. Ottoman interest in the continued supply of 
white slaves was in no way diminished…199 
 
The prohibition of the slave trade in 1854 was the first step for the future 
abandonment of the Circassian slave from the Ottoman society. However, at that 
time neither the Ottoman society nor the Ottoman government was ready for a more 
radical initiative.200 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 “The Eastern Black Shore”, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, Vol. 78, No.: 481 (November 
1855), p. 529. 
199 Ehud R. Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression: 1840-1890 (Princeton, 1982), 
pp. 122-123. 
200 The actual prohibition of the Circassian slave trade would come only in 1909. Gölen, p. 57. 
 74
H. Sefer Pasha’s diplomatic efforts and the Treaty of Paris  
 
Before the Treaty of Paris, on 5 March 1856, Sefer Pasha addressed to the 
Russian command with his letter from Anapa.201 Having declared his rule over the 
Circassians, Sefer Pasha guaranteed that he would not undertake any military action 
against Russia, but in turn, he wanted from Russia not to take any oppressive 
attitude. He, very well knew that for the independence of Circassia the result in the 
Paris Congress was now much more critical than any military victory. At the same 
time, the Abzekhs, Shapsughs, and Natukhays decided to send a large delegation to 
Istanbul to request the protection of the Ottoman Empire. Muhammed Emin and 
Sefer Pasha’s son Karabatır were also members of the deputation. Deputation was 
accepted by the Sultan, and it was promised for a new war with Russia to banish 
Russian troops forever from Circassia in return to continuation of war of the 
Circassians with the faith of Islam and loyalty to the Padishah.202 If there really 
occurred such a meeting, it mean that the Ottoman Empire returned its pre-war 
policy of abstaining from any involvement in the matters of the Caucasus rather than 
a sign of support to the Circassian struggle. 
 
During the process of the signature of the Treaty of Paris, Sefer Pasha insisted 
on a provision, which would put Circassia under the Ottoman suzerainty. However, 
                                                 
201 Kerashev, p. 108. 
202 Polovinkina, p. 142.  
According to another source, it was Sefer Pasha who sent a deputation of 250 people to Istanbul on 
the advice of Britain in order to request the unification of Circassia with the Ottoman Empire. Istoriia 
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the Circassian question was not in the agenda of the Ottoman delegation in Paris.203 
The Treaty of Paris, signed on 30 March 1856, did not include any provision that 
would change the situation in the Caucasus.204  
 
The four points of the Vienna Congress, which were previously refused by the 
Russian government, were brought to the negotiation table again.205 While Britain 
waited more compensation from Russia, France pursued a much more conciliatory 
policy. Britain actually did not overall abandon the idea of independent Poland and 
Circassia. Actually, during the process of negotiations Britain did not fully give up 
its interests in the Caucasus, and a military operation to the Caucasus remained a 
possibility. However, France might think that an independent or an Ottoman vassal 
Circassia would be under the control of Britain. The reluctance of Britain to continue 
the war without the support of France paved the way to such a moderate treaty.206  
 
The most important provision of the agreement was the tenth provision about 
the limitation of the Russian naval armament in the Black Sea. According to this 
provision, Russia should have only ten ships to control the Circassian coasts.  
 
In the short run, without battleships and without fortifications along the 
Circassian shores, which were totally destroyed in the course of the Crimean War, 
                                                 
203 Polovinkina, p. 143. 
204 For the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris, see, Erim, pp. 315-363. 
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Russia could not establish its quarantine any time soon. In these circumstances, the 
trade between Circassians and the Ottomans also increased. However, the most 
important gain of the Circassians from this process was that they were spared from 
the Russian aggression at least for three years. Since the Treaty of Paris did not cover 
the Circassian question, the pre-war order was reestablished in the Caucasus.  
 
 
I. Assessments 
 
In 1853 when the Russo-Ottoman war broke up, Circassians’ hope to get the 
Russians out of their territories revived. In this war, as the previous Russo-Ottoman 
wars, the Caucasus was envisaged to play a significant role. The Ottoman strategy in 
the Caucasian front, initially, did not seem to be defensive. However, the initial 
Ottoman defeats in the Russo-Ottoman border and the destruction of the Ottoman 
fleet, which was charged to transport the ammunitions and military forces to Batum, 
forced the Ottoman Empire to take a more defensive stance. French and British 
involvements in the war, once more, encouraged the Porte to conduct an effective 
and offensive strategy in the Caucasus. Nevertheless, this time the Allied powers 
themselves did not allow the Ottoman Empire to engage in a campaign in the 
Caucasus, most probably having in their mind to have a limited war only in the 
Crimea which was deemed sufficient to enforce their terms on Russia.  
 
Had the Ottoman Empire better investigated the current situation in the 
Caucasus, and started its initiative with a well-established plan, the mountaineers of 
the Caucasus, especially the Circassians would have been used in a better way during 
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the war. The destruction of the Ottoman navy and the failures of the Anatolian army 
in the Caucasian front prevented the Ottoman Empire to be successful in the 
Caucasian front. While the Ottoman army could not succeed in the southern 
Caucasus, the Ottoman envoys in Circassia also failed to attract the mountaineers. 
Not surprisingly, among the mountaineers, whose war strategy was defensive in 
character as it aimed at defending their homeland, calls for a war in a foreign land 
could hardly find a positive response. 
  
Actually, the Ottoman Empire did not develop and pursue a clear and well-
designed policy in terms of Circassia during the Crimean War. The Ottoman wish for 
the return of Circassia under the Ottoman suzerainty was obvious. It was 
contemplated at the Porte argued that for any serious move concerning the North 
Caucasus it would be wiser to await the conclusion of the war. However, even 
though the Ottomans were on the victor’s side, probably as a result of the fall of 
Kars, they abandoned their plans over Circassia.  
 
On the other hand, instead of unifying it, rather the Ottoman strategies even 
more divided Circassia. Even no use of the forces of Sheikh Shamil could be made. 
Nonetheless, its dependence upon the strategies and programs of Britain and France 
was decisive in the Ottoman failure in the Caucasus. The question to what extent the 
allied powers accepted the Ottoman Empire as a genuine ally does not need much 
elaboration. During the war, the allies concentrated on the battle in Sevastopol, and 
did not let the Ottoman Empire pursue an active strategy in Circassia. Throughout 
the ongoing process of war it became clear that Britain and France had only limited 
aims, which were based primarily on the delimitation of the influence of Russia on 
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the international arena. The destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet became the 
primary target of the Allies, while all other objectives were secondary.  
 
The Ottoman relations with the mountaineers was pragmatic in character, 
based on the utilization of the mountaineers during the war. The Ottoman army did 
not engage in any military operation in the Northern Caucasus except for 
transporting ammunitions to the Circassian coasts and sending envoys to encourage 
the Circassians to participate actively in the war. Most probably, the Circassians, 
being freed from the Russian assault, did not think it necessary to get involved in the 
war.207 According to Ahmed Cevdet, Circassian silence during the war was because 
of the mistaken Ottoman policies. Pashas, who were former slaves, were sent to 
Circassia. However, in the eyes of the Circassian, the Ottoman titles were not 
important and they cannot be regarded as nobles. What’s more the attempt to prevent 
the slave trade also negatively affected the Ottoman-Circassian relations.208  
 
On the other hand, while Sheikh Shamil attacked Georgia two times, and the 
Ottoman navy landed 10.000 soldiers and ammunitions to Batum, any coordinated 
operation of offensive character in the Caucasus could not be organized. The 
Ottoman forces in Batum remained silent and passive. The other Ottoman army in 
Kars also became unsuccessful in its attempt to invade Georgia, and routed by the 
Russians. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire was unable to recover its losses in the 
eastern coasts of the Black Sea; nor could an independent Circassia be established. 
                                                 
207 According to Marks and Engels, Circassians, only accustomed to wage war in their own territories, 
were happy that the Russians were moved back, and they did not want to participate in the war on the 
side of the Allied forces. Genotsid Adygov, p. 115.   
208 Cevdet Paşa, p. 90. 
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Shortly after the Crimean War, the defense of the Caucasus completely failed and 
one of the most dramatic deportations in the world history took place.  
 80
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
AFTER THE CRIMEAN WAR: 
THE LAST PHASE OF THE RUSSO-CIRCASSIAN WAR 
AND THE OTTOMAN RELATIONS (1856-1864) 
 
After the Peace Treaty of Paris the hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and 
the Russian Empire was replaced with a rapprochement, which would cripple the 
activities of Sefer Pasha and Muhammed Emin in their struggle against Russia.209 
Russia’s revitalized attack to Circassia did not wait long. Not only was the Russian 
government much determined to end the war, but also the Caucasian mountaineers 
were now aware that a foreign intervention, which had not come during the Crimean 
War, was now an even more a distant possibility. On the other hand, the commercial 
ships which transported the Circassian and the Polish fighters, as well as 
ammunitions and gunpowder to the Circassian shores, caused suspicions about the 
continuation of the British as well as the Ottoman involvement in the Caucasus. 
 
 
A. Sefer Pasha and Muhammed Emin’s last efforts  
 
After the Crimean War the Porte did not cease its activities abruptly but kept 
on acting in Circassia via Sefer Pasha. In 1856, while he was trying to unite the 
                                                 
209 Mustafa Budak, “Kanguru Olayı: Kırım Savaşı’ndan Sonra Çerkezistan’a Silah ve Mühimmat 
Gönderilmesi” in İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, No.: 15, (Istanbul, 
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Circassians, Sefer Pasha would continue to enjoy receiving his salary.210 In the same 
year, Sefer Pasha invited the nobles and elders to Anapa to discuss the situation, in 
which Muhammed Emin also participated. On the other hand, Karabatır was charged 
to operate near the river Kuban with 2 battalions of infantry and 5 cannons.211  
 
However, as a result of the advance of the Russian armies, the Circassians 
evacuated Anapa having destroyed it on 14 June 1856. The discussion about the 
reason of the destruction of the Anapa fortress in one of the Ottoman documents 
showed the continuation of the Ottoman involvement in Circassia in summer 
1856.212  
 
Afterwards, Sefer Pasha moved near the river Shebzh. Actually, he tried not to 
take any hostile action against Russia, before having achieved full political 
consolidation of the Circassians under his rule. During the second half of 1856, Sefer 
Pasha in correspondence with the Russian military authorities tried to find a way for 
peace. He underlined that the Circassians as an independent people who had 
participated in the Crimean War in alliance with the Ottoman Empire. He wrote to G. 
I. Filipson:  
 
If You wanted to open negotiations with us, it was necessary not to enter 
our borders with armed-hands, but [You] should stay out of our borders and 
declare Your desire to negotiate with us. However, on the contrary, if you 
are going to open war on us, as it is well known, that so far no government 
could subdue our mountains with powerful weapons, and we will not be 
                                                 
210 His salary was ceased on 7 March 1857 with the reason that he lost his official status as a result of 
his residence in the Caucasus with his own desire. BOA A.MKT.NZD, Dosya No:216, Gömlek No.: 9, 
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subject of anybody. We demand that all governments should consider us as 
a separate people... with this purpose we have sent our special envoy to 
You.213  
 
Sefer Pasha wanted to conclude an agreement with Russia as an independent 
government, thereby trying to put the Circassian question in the international 
agenda.214 However, contrary to the appeals of Sefer Pasha, Russian authorities 
continued their military activities in Circassia. 
 
3 November 1856, one Russian detachment consisting of two battalions, one 
hundred Cossacks, and some mountaineers with 4 cannons came up Novorossiysk. 
Sefer Pasha was compelled to leave Novorossiysk, after it was plunged into ruins, 
and retreated to Neberjaysk. Nineteen Turkish and Greek vessels harbored at 
Novorossiysk captured by the Russians.215  
 
According to Pokrovskii, Sefer Pasha proclaimed that he got the order of the 
Porte to unite all the Western Caucasus for common activities against Russia, and for 
this aim a 4.000 force was allocated by the Ottoman Empire.216  
 
Backed by the Ottoman Empire at least by words, and simultaneously trying to 
find a common ground with the Russians, Sefer Pasha was also in search of the 
consolidation of his rule in Circassia. To this aim, Sefer Pasha’s forces clashed with 
those of Muhammed Emin fought near Tuapse, in where Karabatır defeated 
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Muhammed Emin.217 Sefer Pasha also ruined the quays in Tuapse, which were 
serving as the centers of supply of Abzekhs and Bzhedughs who did not consent his 
position. According to him, Muhammed Emin was a traitor who had no authorization 
by the Sultan. Sefer Pasha seems to attain a solid position in Circassia in June 1856 
by getting the support of the important portion of the Circassians.218  
 
Most probably the Ottoman support behind him, even if a mere verbal one, 
helped him significantly in extending his power at the expense of Muhammed Emin. 
On the other hand, Muhammed Emin also sought to get the Ottoman patronage. In 
1856, Muhammed Emin came to Istanbul; however, his efforts proved fruitless: 
 
... the current wish of the mentioned Pasha [Muhammed Emin] is [a] 
Circassia, which would be given under his rule together with some 
privileges, however, since the interference of the Ottoman Empire in the 
[current] circumstances concerning that place [Circassia] was prohibited by 
the Peace Treaty … that those who want this Pasha are [only] a few tribes 
[while] other tribes under no circumstances accept [him] and the conditions 
he is currently in seems to be quite precarious ….219 
 
As he understood that he could not achieve the support of the Porte, 
Muhammed Emin wanted some financial help, which was actually realized, most 
probably in order to accelerate his departure from the Ottoman territory: 
 
...this gentleman [Muhammed Emin], during the war, was hardly successful 
in serving [the Ottoman Empire] there [in Circassia], [and the] enmity 
between himself and Sefer Pasha caused the complete division [of 
Circassia], anyway; his departure from here [from Istanbul] will entirely be 
beneficial, and under these conditions he will need help for his return [to 
Circassia, therefore an] a funding of 25.000 kuruş shall be granted...220  
 
                                                 
217 Ibid. 
218 Kerashev, pp. 109-110. 
219 BOA İ.MMS, Dosya No.: 311, 23 Muharrem 1273 [23 September 1856]. 
220 BOA İ.MMS, Dosya No.: 317, 9 Safer 1273 [9 October 1856]. 
 84
In April 1857, Muhammed Emin again came to Istanbul in order to provide the 
Ottoman backing. However, as a result of the Russian demand this time he was 
exiled to Damascus.221 He succeeded in returning to Circassia only in November.222 
Then, in 1858 Muhammed Emin once more came to Istanbul. However, his last 
effort also ended up with no gains.223  
 
In 1857, Sefer Pasha wrote a letter to Istanbul, which was also signed by many 
of the Circassian elders and noblemen. In this letter he asked the Porte not to allow 
Muhammed Emin to return to Circassia. He also asked for the compensation of the 
losses of a merchant from Trabzon, whose ship was captured by the Russian officials 
at the Soğucak Bay. What’s more he claimed that Circassia was now united under his 
rule and had an established army and a state system. Accordingly, the independence 
of Circassia (Çerkezistan’ın serbest kalmaklığı) should be recognized.224 
 
 In 1857, Sefer Pasha persisted in demanding from Russia the recognition of 
the political independence of Circassia. He addressed to the Russian command in the 
Caucasus:  
 
All tribes recognizing my authority have sworn never to cease obedience. I, 
from my part, will use all my diligence to ratify the inviolability of our 
sacred religion and our customs, to arrange and form infantry, cavalry and 
artillery and if the Emperor recognizes our independence we shall accept 
foreign consuls for conducting commercial relations with Russia as well as 
other powers, otherwise we do not recognize the authority of the Christians 
above ourselves up to the last time that we are completely exterminated.225  
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According to Kerashev, during 1858 and 1859 Sefer Pasha undertook 
numerous attempts to find a common language with Muhammed Emin against 
Russia, but he could not be successful in this effort till the former’s death in 
December 1859.226 Their meeting in the Abzekh lands in April 1858 proved in 
consequential. During the negotiations that continued for 8 days they could not find 
in a common ground.227  
 
On the other hand, according to Pokrovskii, in late 1858 Ömer Bey, the 
personal adjutant of the War Minister Rıza Pasha, was sent to Circassia with the 
letter of Rıza Pasha, in order to encourage the Circassians to continue their 
resistance.228 However, this case is yet to be confirmed by the Ottoman documents, if 
there are any. Nonetheless, to the very end of his struggle, Sefer Pasha never 
abandoned his hope to attain the support of the Ottoman Empire and claimed that he 
was fighting against both the intrigues of Russia and Muhammed Emin.229 Most 
importantly, Sefer Pasha attempted several times to end the war in the Northwestern 
Caucasus via negotiations with Russia, however Russia’s strict policy of subduing 
the Caucasus prevented to find a common ground.  
 
In 1859, with the end of the war in the Eastern Caucasus the Russian army 
stepped up its efforts to suppress Circassia too. In that year, Muhammed Emin 
abandoned his struggle following the advice of Sheikh Shamil. He continued to stay 
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in the Abzekh lands as a religious leader, but he was no longer a political leader.230 
On the other hand, after Sefer Pasha’s death in December 1859, the Circassians went 
on with their military and diplomatic efforts for a few years to come. 
 
 
B. The Russian quarantine in Circassia: Kangaroo and Chesapeake affairs 
 
The arrival of the British steamship Strambolo (or Stromboli) in July 1856 in 
the Circassian coast was the sign of the continuation of the international contacts.231 
Actually, due to the lack of any fortifications on the Black Sea Coast, and only with a 
few vessels for quarantine, it was not possible for Russia to isolate Circassia.  
 
1857 was one of the busiest years in terms of the discussion of the Circassian 
question in the international arena. In February 1857, a British steamship Kangaroo, 
which was loaded with weapons, ammunitions, as well as two hundred of Polish and 
Hungarian soldiers landed in the Circassian coasts.  
 
Kangaroo, which was rent by the previous Minister of Post İsmail Pasha, who 
was a Circassian, left Istanbul during 11-16 February. After visiting Sinop on 1 
March, Kangaroo arrived at Tuapse. This initiative was headed by Janos Bandia 
(Mirliva Mehmed Pasha), former colonel of the Hungarian army and now a Turkish 
                                                 
230 Soon Muhammed Emin went to Istanbul. There he continued to act for the Circassian cause. In 
1862, he met with the Circassian delegation, and advised them to start peace negotiations with Russia. 
Muhammed Emin died in Armutköy of Bursa in 1899. Polovinkina, pp. 146-147. 
231  Kerashev, p. 110. 
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Pasha. Teophil Lapinski, one of the significant figures of the last phase of the 
Circassian defense, also came with this mission.232  
 
Bandia, at the very moment of his arrival in Tuapse, sent his envoys to Sefer 
Pasha and Muhammed Emin with letters claiming that he was sent by the Turkish 
government to command the military forces of Circassia. Sefer Pasha met him with a 
large delegation of Circassians, but Muhammed Emin sent his greetings only. Bandia 
even married the daughter of a Circassian elder to take the local support behind in 
Circassia.233 
 
In March 1857, Bandia’s legion crossed the Aderbievsk near Gelincik. There 
were established stores for military equipments as well as houses. According to 
Pokrovskii, Bandia’s detachments immediately accelerated the slave trade from 
Gelincik.234 On the other hand, while Bandia and his team started their activities in 
Circassia, in Istanbul as a result of this initiative a diplomatic crisis between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire broke out in Istanbul. 
 
Kangaroo incident was noted by the Russian Consulate in Sinop to the Russian 
Embassy in Istanbul. The crisis troubled the diplomatic circles in Istanbul and the 
                                                 
232 Janos Bandia, who was a Hungarian born adventurer, became first a French, then a Russian and 
English spy, afterwards he searched fortune in Algeria, and then published a newspaper in Pressburg. 
In 1853, he came to Turkey, adopted Islam and got the rank of colonel. Pokrovskii, p. 289.  
 According to Kerashev, Janos Bandia’s aims were not clear. While he came to Circassia secretly as 
an Ottoman general, his letters to the Russian officials bring suspects if he was a Russian agent. In one 
of his letters in August of 1857 Janos Bandia wrote to Filipson, “Russia requires people and exactly 
such people as Circassians who are multiplied as a locust and born as soldiers.  But a Circassia, 
necessary for Russia, can be the one which was exterminated to the last rather than which continue to 
be a military power. Circassia should be internally organized and subordinated to the authority of one 
leader again. Russia should support and make him only its debtor, the rest will become by itself.” 
Kerashev, p. 111.   
233 Pokrovskii, p. 290. 
234 Ibid.  
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Porte for a month and a half. During a meeting with the Grand Vizier in February 
1857, Butenev, the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul, claimed that a vessel, which 
was loaded with gunpowder and ammunitions, departed for Circassia; moreover, a 
few ships were also under preparation for an expedition to Circassia. However, he 
also told that, he was confident that it was only an attempt of a few Circassians 
without any involvement of the Porte. On the other hand, the Grand Vizier stated that 
the Porte would not permit such actions of the Circassians. Besides, since the 
friendship between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire was precious for the 
Sultan, not only would these vessels would be destroyed, but also the necessary 
advices to the officials of the Black Sea coast would be written in order to provide 
their caution for such acts.235 On April 1857, the governor of Trabzon wrote to 
Istanbul that he received the firman and would be watchful to curb the transportation 
of the Circassians and ammunitions to Circassia.236 
 
Afterwards, Butenev also gave a written complaint, which included the Russian 
demand of the prevention of the activities of Sefer Pasha, Muhammed Emin, as well 
as Mirliva Mehmed Pasha, i.e. Bandia. Mehmed Pasha, who succeeded in carrying 
weapons, ammunitions and soldiers to the Caucasus, with his collaborators Osman 
Ağa and Ali Bey was demanded to be brought back to Turkey for the sake of 
peace.237  
 
                                                 
237
235 BOA İ.HR, Dosya No.: 7327, 18 Cemaziyelahir 1273 [13 February 1857]. According to Pokrovskii 
before Kangaroo, Butenev also reported a vessel named Aslan, which was prepared to be sent to 
Circassia. Pokrovskii, p. 288. 
236 BOA A.MKT.UM, Dosya No.: 277, Gömlek No.: 8, 7 Şaban 1273 [2 April 1857]. 
 Budak, “Kanguru Olayı: Kırım Savaşı’ndan Sonra Çerkezistan’a Silah ve Mühimmat 
Gönderilmesi,” p. 480. 
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Most probably, after the Kangaroo affair the Porte tried to be more careful for 
the sake of peace with Russia. However, another such affair occurred in autumn of 
1863. A British vessel named Chesapeake laden with weapons and Polish legionaries 
came to Istanbul whence after visiting Trabzon, arrived in Vardan on the Circassian 
coast.238 Most probably, this was the last foreign attempt to support the Circassian 
resistance.  
 
Russia was determined to prevent any repetition of such acts in the future. 
Devoid of efficient quarantine measures, Russia aimed to try to cease the traffic 
between the Ottoman Empire and Circassia in terms of diplomacy. On the other 
hand, the Ottoman Empire took pains in not deteriorating its relations with the 
Russian Empire.  
 
 
C. Last defense during 1860s and deportation of the Circassians 
 
On 13 June 1861, the Shapsughs, Abzekhs and Ubykhs held a meeting in Sochi 
to restructure the civil administration and reorganize the military. ‘The Great and 
Free Assembly’ was established consisting of fifteen elders. Emphasis was laid on 
unity and on pleading the Circassian cause to the Western powers, especially Britain. 
In 1861, a delegation of the Circassian Assembly met with the Russian officials, 
British consul in Sohumkale, and even Tsar Alexander II in Kuban. A large 
delegation of the Circassians came to the river Fars. Among them, 50 representatives 
received by the Tsar. In this meeting, Hacı Giranduk Berzeg, the chieftain of the 
                                                 
238 BOA HR.SYS, Dosya No.: 1205, Gömlek No.: 2, 13 October 1863 – 18 December 1863; Istoriia 
narodov severnogo Kavkaza, p.199. 
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Ubykhs, asked the Tsar to accept the Circassians as his subjects and not to expel 
them from their homelands. However, Tsar did not give any concession and claimed 
that the Abzekhs (probably meaning all the Circassians in the mountains) should 
make the choice in one month whether to settle in Kuban or to leave the mountains 
for Turkey.239  
 
In June 1862, the Assembly resolved to send a special deputation to Istanbul, 
Paris, and London to request support for Circassia. In order to compensate the 
expenditures of the deputation, the Assembly put a tax on each household from 
Tuapse to Adler. The head of the deputation was İsmail Barakay Dziash. The 
Circassian deputation in Istanbul with the help of the Poles worked actively. They 
collected and sent armaments to Circassia. Three members of the deputation in 
Istanbul went to London.240 There again meetings were held to attract public to the 
war in Circassia with the help of the Polish nationalists and David Urquhart.  
 
In 1863, with the Polish uprising the Circassian cause once more came to the 
fore of the British public discussion, and probably last aids to Circassia were sent. 
After the suppression of the Polish revolt, in March 1864, Fuad Pasha and Witold 
Czartoryski, Adam Czartoryski’s younger son, came together in Cairo and discussed 
the Circassian question.241 In the same month, the Ubykhs made their last stand. 
 
In 1864, the Circassian war ended with the victory of the Tsarist armies. On 14 
April 1864, Grand Duke Mikhail met with the Circassian leaders in Sochi and 
                                                 
239 Polovinkina, pp. 151-152; Esadze, p. 81. 
For a broad description of the last phase of the Russo-Circassian war, see, Esadze, pp. 76-111. 
240 Polovinkina, p. 155. 
241 Istoriia narodov severnogo Kavkaza, p. 200.  
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ordered them to leave the highlands and settle in the plains. This was actually a plan 
of Count Yevdokimov, which had been put forward in 1860.242 Those, who refused 
the order, were given an ultimatum to leave for the Ottoman lands within one month, 
or otherwise they would be considered the prisoners of war. On May 21 1864, Grand 
Duke Mikhail proclaimed the end of the Caucasian War.  
 
As a result of decades of war, the Circassians faced the total expulsion from 
Circassia, which involved an enormous human tragedy. Hundreds of thousands 
Circassians and Abkhazians were herded to Taman, Anapa, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, 
Sochi, Adler and Sohumkale, wherefrom they were transported in chartered vessels 
across the Black Sea to the Turkish ports, Trabzon, Samsun, Sinop in the Anatolian 
coasts, as well as Constanta, Varna and Burgaz in the Balkans. 
 
Gardanov alleges that the slave trade was used by the Ottoman agents in their 
provocations for the mass immigration of the Circassians from Circassia.243 Though 
it would be in accurate to see Ottoman provocation behind the Circassian drama in 
the nineteenth century, it is important to note that the opportunity to sell their slaves 
in the Ottoman territory might encourage Circassians to immigrate to the Ottoman 
Empire as well as the desire to continue their war against Russia basing in Caliph’s 
state.244  
                                                 
242 Count Yevdokimov argued that for the complete suppression of the mountaineers, it was necessary 
to evacuate the land between Belaia and Laba rivers from the mountaineers and the Cossacks would 
be settled there. Mountaineers would be asked whether they wanted to settle to the plains or immigrate 
to the Ottoman Empire. Esadze, p. 76. 
243 Gardanov, p. 119. 
244 There were abundant documents in the Ottoman archives on the matter of coming slaves from 
Circassia. On the one hand they signify that there was abundance of slaves on the Ottoman territory 
after the Circassian expulsion from the Caucasus, on the other hand Ottoman Empire tried to control 
this slave traffic with new arrangements. In one of documents it was claimed that sale of the slaves in 
the age of 25-30 would not be banned. BOA. A.MKT.UM, Dosya No.: 561, Gömlek No.: 49, 5 Zilkade 
1278 [4 May 1862].  
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There seemed to be a Russo-Ottoman agreement after the Crimean war for a 
Circassian emigration to the Ottoman territories. However, the numbers discussed 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was as insignificant as 50.000, compared to 
the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Circassians.245 Therefore, if such an 
agreement was existent, it was a diplomatic success of the Russian government for 
the realization of the plans, which had roots from the very time after the Treaty of 
Edirne. In 1835 in one of his letters, Nesselrode discussed the advantages of the 
deportation of the mountaineers to the Ottoman territories.246 
 
Besides the Russian or the Ottoman strategic calculations, the Circassians also 
had their own reasons of to immigrate to the Ottoman lands: it was the state of the 
Caliph which was the only Muslim power resisting against the infidels. It was the 
country, which did not try to subdue them, and the place where they could continue 
their war against Russia. The Sultan himself was their relative, and many Circassians 
occupied the important posts in the Empire.  
 
The Circassians hardly endure any psychology of the foreigner in the Ottoman 
territory. Their role in the military and bureaucracy enhanced after their mass 
immigration. However, this did not mean that their tragedy ended with the settlement 
                                                                                                                                          
Another document explains the conditions of the slave trade, and prohibits the trade of elders, children 
and women sent from Circassia. BOA. A.MKT.NZD, Dosya No.: 396, Gömlek No.: 97, 3 Şaban 1278 
[3 February 1862]. 
245 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics 
(Wisconsin, 1985), p. 67. For the forced emigration of the Caucasian mountaineers in nineteenth 
century see also, G. Mambetov, “Iz istorii nasilstvennogo vyseleniia adygov v Turtsiiu”, Rossiia i 
Cherkesiia (vtoraia polovina XVIII - XIX vv.) (Maykop, 1995), pp. 184-206; N. Berzeg, “Izgnaniie 
cherkesov”, Rossiia i Cherkesiia (vtoraia polovina XVIII - XIX vv.) (Maykop, 1995), pp. 193-207; A. 
Tanina, “Angliia, Rossiia i mahadzhirstvo”, Rossiia i Cherkesiia (vtoraia polovina XVIII - XIX vv.) 
(Maykop, 1995), pp. 207-228; Abdullah Saydam, Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri 1856-1876 (Ankara, 1997); 
Süleyman Erkan, Kırım ve Kafkasya Göçleri (1878-1908) (Trabzon, 1996); Hayati Bice, 
Kafkasya’dan Anadolu’ya Göçler (Ankara, 1991). 
246“From Graf Nesselrode to Baron Rosen, 17 [29] December 1835”, AKAK, Vol. VIII, p. 892.  
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in the Ottoman Empire. A new deportation was to come as a result of the 1877-1878 
Russo-Turkish War. 
 
 
D. Assessments  
  
After the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire tried to maintain the peace with 
Russia. Therefore, while the Crimean war represented an anomaly in the Ottoman-
Circassian relations, the post- war Ottoman policy hardly had any difference with the 
pre-war policy established after the Treaty of Edirne. On the other hand, there were 
now two leaders in Circassia: Sefer Pasha in the Natukhay and Shapsugh lands, and 
Muhammed Emin in the Abzekh and connected territories. None of them received 
the moral and the material help of the Porte. While the Porte was more sympathetic 
to Sefer Pasha, they both could hardly get any significant help. On the other hand, 
the Polish and the Circassian émigrés actually tried to do their best to keep on the 
Circassian defensive. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Maybe the lack of leadership, which might have united the Western Caucasus 
under one rule, can be mentioned as the most significant weakness of Circassia in 
comparison to the Eastern Caucasus. However, some kind of stately establishments 
and emergence of an understanding of nationhood were under way during the war 
with Russia, which helped Circassia to resist for decades. Characteristically, 
diplomatic missions became one of the main aspects of the Circassian resistance. The 
Circassians soon accustomed to the war and the international relations, and tried to 
make use of the Eastern Question for their own cause. The road to an independent 
Circassia would pass through the capitals of the European powers, and the 
Circassians were conscious of the situation. The Circassians also made use of their 
geographical peculiarities. Circassia was not only a difficult terrain for the invaders, 
but also in contrast to the Eastern Caucasus it was not isolated and had well-
established contacts with the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Though it might have seemed somewhat utopic or unrealistic, a hope for a 
foreign support was one of the strengths of the Circassians. While the actual foreign 
aid to the Circassians throughout the war remained insignificant, the belief for a 
prospective foreign intervention always kept the fire of the Circassian resistance. 
Circassians, up until the very last moment, entertained the hope that the Western 
powers, especially England, would intervene on their behalf in the Russo-Circassian 
War, or a Russo-Ottoman War would reestablish the pre-Edirne Treaty conditions. 
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Therefore, they gave special importance to maintain their contacts with the Ottoman 
Empire and Britain. That expectation reached its climax after the defeat of the 
Russians in the Crimean War in 1856. They were well aware that without foreign 
help, military as well as diplomatic, they could not maintain their defense 
everlastingly. Therefore, while they were resisting in the mountains, they also did not 
forget that diplomatic missions were as important as the military victories. That is 
one of the reasons why Zanoko Sefer’s name was so significant in the Russo-
Circassian War, and maybe much more legendary than the names of Hacı Degumuko 
Berzeg or Hacı Kizbech, well-known tribal leaders famous with their victories 
against Russia.  
 
Zanoko Sefer (later Sefer Bey and Sefer Pasha) deserves the most attention in 
regard to his activities before and during the Crimean War as a Circassian leader as 
well as an Ottoman Pasha. Though he lived in the Ottoman Empire for more than 
two decades after the Treaty of Edirne and Russia took pains prevent his activities, 
Zanoko Sefer preserved his connections with Circassia, and continued to be the sole 
Circassian abroad who carried out the organization of the diplomatic mission. It can 
be argued that to some extent he played the same role for the Circassians, what 
Adam Czartoryski played for the Poles.  
 
It is not possible to pronounce that a considerable foreign help was guaranteed 
to the Circassian missions. However, Zanoko Sefer and the Circassian delegates not 
only preserved the Circassian question in the international agenda, but they also 
maintained the hope of a foreign help. On the other hand, while the foreign support 
was modest, this was still important (or if not vital) for Circassia where during the 
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war many commodities were scarce, among which arms and salt were critically 
important.  
 
On the other hand, the Polish émigrés and missions were actively involved in 
with the Circassian question quite actively. They not only supported the Circassians 
from abroad politically, but also participated in the war against Russia in the 
Circassian mountains. However, all these efforts of both the Circassian and Polish 
émigrés initiated from the Ottoman soil.  
 
Actually, the Ottoman Empire could not engage in the Caucasian matters 
because of its internal problems. The Porte always abstained from causing any 
conflict with Russia, being aware of its relative weakness comparing to the northern 
neighbor. Therefore, it is not possible to bring an argument for the active 
participation of the Ottoman Empire. However, its role yet should not be 
underestimated. One of the important aspects of the role of the Ottoman Empire was 
its deep-seated relations with Circassia culturally247 and commercially. For the 
Circassians, the Ottoman Empire was almost a second fatherland not only because it 
was the Caliph’s state, but also due to many historical cultural, commercial and 
social bonds. The mass immigration of the Circassians to the Ottoman territories 
after their defeat also should be understood in this context.  
 
The Circassians carried out their commercial relations exclusively with the 
Ottoman Empire, while the Ottoman lands were the sole market for their most 
important commodity – slaves. The war in the commercial arena brought two 
                                                 
247 The Hajj affair and the Mollas coming from Ottoman Empire also should be added to the 
Circassian-Ottoman relations, and needed to be elaborated, which this work could not accomplish.  
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important results: while on the one hand, trade with Russia decreased dramatically, 
on the other, agricultural and animal production decreased and the slave trade 
became almost the sole income for the Circassians to meet their needs. The 
Circassians totally depended on the importation of salt, fabrics and ammunitions. 
They had to pay back with their agricultural products and of course slaves. The main 
market and the distribution center of the Circassian slave trade was Istanbul, as it had 
been for centuries. Slave trade also had a significant place in the Ottoman society.248 
Not only it was the base of the harem system in the Ottoman society, these slaves 
were also virtually absorbed by the society as servants, officials, generals etc. In the 
Ottoman Empire, it was possible for a talented slave to reach the highest social ranks 
since the Ottoman society was not of a caste structure.  
 
In addition, in the Ottoman soil Circassians also conducted relations with the 
European powers, Polish émigrés and the Ottoman officials of the Circassian origin, 
which played a role in favor of the Circassians. In fact, the Porte was not the 
organizer, and only rarely it might encourage or condone, but in general it tried to 
prevent the activities of the Circassians not to deteriorate the Russo-Ottoman 
relations.  
 
Ottoman archives are generally silent and only in the cases of some kind of a 
crisis with Russia then it became possible to see the documents on activities of the 
                                                 
248 In the literature also it was possible to see the effect and the role of the Circassians. Felâtun Bey ile 
Râkım Efendi and Esaret of Ahmet Mithat Efendi, and Sergüzeşt of Sami Paşazade Sezai can be given 
as examples, as the former optimistic, and the latters pessimistic views for the slavery in the Ottoman 
Empire. For a general discussion of slavery as a theme in the Tanzimat literature, see İsmail Parlatır, 
Tanzimat Edebiyatında Kölelik (Ankara, 1992).  
Many examples of the Anatolian folk music include the themes and subjects related to the Circassians 
as well. 
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Circassians or the Poles.249 While we can argue that the Ottoman Empire tried to 
keep the peace with the Russian Empire, it probably could not control its officials 
completely in the Circassian matter. As for Britain, Ponsonby acted differently from 
the government and Urquhart had his own diplomacy, a similar case can also be 
speculated for the Ottoman Empire. While the state was trying to preserve the peace 
and friendly relations with Russia, the Pashas of Circassian origin had their own 
agendas. Though a comprehensive study is needed to assess their activities 
completely, one can argue that Russia exaggerated their role to ascribe its own 
failures to the foreign undermining activities. Apart from that, there is no evidence of 
the dispatch of an Ottoman agent to Circassia save for the Crimean War period. 
 
However, relations of the Circassians with the outside world, on the other 
hand, alerted Russia to a great extent that Russia set the insulation of Circassia, in 
both economic and political terms, one of the most important parts of its plan to 
subdue the Circassian territories fully. Russia, very soon after the Treaty of Edirne, 
engaged in a naval blockade, and then supported this blockade with establishment of 
a number of fortifications in the Eastern Black Sea shores. It was declared that any 
trade with the Circassians, with the exception of a few ports under its control, was 
illegal and would be prevented. By this way, it aimed to close the Circassian coasts 
to the foreign vessels. Russia had two main aims in establishing this blockade: first, 
it would isolate the mountaineers from Turkey and other powers, thereby preventing 
any deliveries of weapons, powder, salt, and the entrance of foreign emissaries; and 
                                                 
249 Kangaroo crisis, Zanoko Sefer’s 15 years exile in Rumelia, or Muhammed Emin’s exile to 
Damascus in 1857 when he came for petition to Istanbul are the famous examples of Ottoman 
Empire’s careful and defensive policy against Russia.  
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second, simultaneously to make the Russian trade protected from any foreign 
competition, and thus to connect the Circassians to Russia via trade.250  
 
In addition, considering the Caucasian wars absolutely its internal matter, 
Russia tried hard to prevent any discussion on the Caucasian matters among the 
international circles. Russia was always uneasy about the activities of the Polish and 
the Circassian émigrés, though it was not always possible to press the Ottoman 
Empire to prevent their activities, when Britain or France were also involved in the 
issue.  
 
As for the British policy in the Near East, it had two main characteristics: To 
preserve the security of the way to the India, as well as those of the British 
commercial rights and privileges in the Near East. For both concerns the Caucasus 
had a certain role, though the Caucasus was rather on the periphery since the main 
competition was going on in the capital of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
In the course of the Russo-Circassian war, the Crimean War constituted an 
exceptional period. It changed the international context for three years though 
afterwards the previous order was reestablished. The inactive stay of Sefer Pasha in 
Sohumkale for months, the Ottoman support for both Sefer Pasha and Muhammed 
Emin all showed that the Ottoman Empire could not develop a clear-cut plan and 
could not pursue any strategy, and the war years passed with absolutely no gains for 
both the Ottomans and the Circassians. However, to the failures of the Ottoman 
Empire policies of Britain and France also should be added. With the desire of the 
                                                 
250 Vladimir Degoev, Bolshaia igra na Kavkaze: istoriia i sovremennost (Moscow, 2001), p. 77. 
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Allied command the Ottoman army and navy to a large extent pacified and only 
played the role of walking-on part in the war, therefore it was also difficult to 
develop and pursue an efficient Caucasian policy for the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Throughout the war, the Russian policy was extremely strict and bloody. 
Esadze, after describing a storm and the destruction of a Circassian village, 
underlined the importance of such attacks for subduing the Circassians. He argued 
that these attacks forced the Circassians to refuge to the mountains where they could 
not resist long, leaving the productive farms to the Cossack settlers.251 The 
Circassians were faced with only two options: the resettlement in the plains in the 
Russian territory which promised only a dubious future under the rule of their most 
hatred enemy and the emigration to the Ottoman lands abandoning all their material 
and spiritual possessions behind. They chose the latter. However, they did not forget 
their country, and many continued their struggle during their lives in the Ottoman 
Empire hardly losing their hopes to return Circassia.  
 
Russian conquest of Circassia undoubtedly changed the destiny of the 
Circassians. The previous conquest of Circassia by Huns, Mongols, and Tatars 
before, did not bring any significant change in the demographic picture of the 
Western Caucasus. However, the Russian invasion changed the local demography 
significantly. The Russian conquest was followed with the nearly total expulsion of 
the Circassians. It was the result of the imperialist understanding of the Russian 
Empire: the invaded land had to become a part of the core of the country and the 
Russians perceived themselves not as invaders but simply as the new masters. 
                                                 
251 Esadze, p. 75. 
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Following incorporation of the South Caucasus, and Russia which had plans to 
advance further to the south did not want a land enjoying an independent way of life. 
The complete suppression of the North Caucasus was seen as an absolute necessity 
for two main reasons: First, the North Caucasus was seen as the internal matter of the 
Russian Empire, and the war was merely a struggle against the rebels who did not 
obey the legitimate authority. Second, the people who inhabit the Russian 
borderlands and had special relations with the Ottoman Empire should be somehow 
eliminated to provide the secure boundaries.  
 
After the Russian conquest in 1864, the number of Circassians in the North-
western Caucasus drastically declined. Actually, the immigration from Circassia 
started after the Edirne Treaty, accelerated after 1860s, and then came the exodus of 
1864. Even after 1864, the Circassian immigration continued. Less than 200.000 
remained in the Caucasus scattered over a wide area extending from Mozdok in the 
east to the Black Sea in the west. The Russian and the Cossack colonists gradually 
occupied the places left by the Circassians, especially along the strategically 
important Black Sea littoral, which was cleared of the Circassian presence except for 
a few tiny pockets.  
 
To sum up, any active policy of the Ottoman Empire in the affairs of Circassia 
throughout the Russo-Circassian War of 1830-1864 could hardly be discerned with 
the exception of the Crimean War period. The Ottoman Empire, known as “the sick 
man of Europe”, was in search of cures for its own disorders. It tried to provide its 
security against Russia by pursuing a politics of balance, and a war with Russia was 
the last thing the Porte desired. However, geographical proximity and accessibility of 
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the Ottoman Empire for the Circassians played a vital role during their resistance. In 
this context, Russia’s apprehensions were not absolutely groundless. The activities of 
the Circassian and the Polish émigrés as well as of the European diplomatic circles 
were mainly conducted thorough the Ottoman soil. Therefore, it can be argued that 
the role of the Ottoman Empire was broader than its policies in case of Circassia. 
That was probably one of the reasons why the Russian Empire saw the total 
expulsion of this people as the only solution for the complete control of the 
Circassian territories.  
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